


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
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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Saturday, 28 November 1992




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
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What Difference Will the Election Make for South Korea?

The election is likely to be more significant for the process of democratization than for government policy. The three major candidates all advocate a free market economic system, gradual steps toward peaceful reunification with North Korea, and close ties to the US. In several ways, however, the presidential election—the second since democratic reform began in 1987—will be a milestone. It will strengthen the precedent for a peaceful transfer of power under the Constitution, and it may also bring about important changes in the nature of the country's election practices and its leadership:

- This election will mark the first time in 30 years that South Korea has a president without a military background, reinforcing the civilians' control of the government.
- If the government and the security services, which have pledged to be neutral, interfere less than they have in the past, this contest could help institutionalize a higher standard of electoral fairness.
- Voters may also help ease regional animosities by bringing to power a leader who is not a native of Taegu city in North Kyongsang Province, home of South Korea's past three Presidents.


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SOUTH KOREA: Presidential Campaign Commences

Polls show Democratic Liberal Party candidate Kim Young Sam is the current frontrunner in South Korea's presidential race, but the vote probably will be close, and, with three major candidates, the winner probably will get only a plurality of the votes.

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Early polls indicate about 30 percent of the voters support Kim Young Sam. The DLP has the largest regional bases and the strongest grassroots organizations—both key factors in recent elections.

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Nonetheless [redacted] Kim may not be able to count on party support outside his native southeast. The DLP also has been hit by a series of defections recently; a prominent legislator [redacted]

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[redacted] quit the party last week. [redacted]

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Kim Dae Jung, the Democratic Party candidate, has about 20 percent of the vote, according to several polls. His support seems solid in the southwest—in North and South Cholla Provinces and among Cholla natives in Seoul—and Kim is striving to make inroads in other areas. He is shedding his image as a leftist opposition firebrand and striving to be recognized as more than just a regional leader. He is clearly hoping for a split among DLP voters to give him the victory, [redacted]

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Among the other candidates, former Hyundai Corporation Chairman Chung Ju Yung of the United People's Party trails in the polls, but he could attract votes away from Kim Young Sam, especially since several of the DLP dropouts have joined the UPP. [redacted]

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Comment: The main challenge to Kim Young Sam will be to persuade DLP faction members from areas outside the southeast to campaign vigorously for him in their strongholds. In the key battleground of Seoul, Lee Jong Chan—a former DLP official and the candidate of the minor New Korea Party—may also draw votes away from Kim Young Sam. [redacted]

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
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SOUTH AFRICA: Modest Progress in Talks

[Redacted] government and ANC officials are playing down the results of last week's bilateral meetings. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] The two sides agreed to hold the first nonracial elections next year and to streamline the process when multiparty talks resume. Government officials claim substantial compromises were made on transitional governing arrangements and on the devolution of power to regional governments. The talks apparently have also helped restore trust between the parties. [Redacted]

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Comment: The parties probably are minimizing their progress in order to avoid renewal of the charges of collusion that followed their last high-profile meeting in September. Although they are likely to continue to reach bilateral agreements on key issues, they almost certainly recognize the need to forge a broader consensus through multiparty talks. Nevertheless, trust between the two and progress in the talks remain fragile. The political environment continues to deteriorate and could decline further if a rightwing backlash to the recent violence against whites materializes and aggressive tactics by Zulu Chief Buthelezi intensify. [Redacted]

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SOUTH KOREA: Government Pressing Opposition

The major opposition candidates for president are denouncing investigations into their campaign activities. [Redacted]

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The government says Hyundai Corporation has made sizable illegal donations to United People's Party candidate Chung Ju Yung, who is Hyundai's former chairman. Several Hyundai officials have been arrested. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] On Sunday police searched the offices of the largest dissident group, which recently endorsed DP candidate Kim Dae Jung. [Redacted]

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
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
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


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
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
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
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East Asia

— South Korea's largest opposition party yesterday nominated Kim Dae Jung for president ... placed third in 1987 presidential race



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
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
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In Brief

East Asia

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— Japanese trade surplus up last month, strong yen boosting export earnings, sluggish economy reducing imports . . . surplus this year \$88 billion already, exceeds 1986 record . . . by yearend will near \$110 billion, 40 percent with US. [Redacted]

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— South Korean presidential election set for Friday, 18 December, press reports say . . . opposition fears young supporters may take long weekend, not vote . . . ruling-party candidate Kim Young Sam widely considered frontrunner in close contest. [Redacted]

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Eurasia

— Chechen President Dudayev yesterday urged public to drive Russian troops out of republic . . . keeping up rhetoric against Moscow. Chechen army outgunned, border incidents possible. [Redacted]

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— Russian CFE negotiator last week proposed more flexibility on methods used to eliminate treaty-limited equipment . . . intended to lower costs, speed destruction . . . except for Soviet successor states most signatories probably opposed. [Redacted]

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— Moscow, Minsk reportedly agree on schedule for withdrawal of ICBMs from Belarus by December 1994 . . . talks with Kazakhstan continue . . . Russia probably hopes agreements will press Ukraine to fulfill nuclear-free commitment. [Redacted]

(b)(3)

— Miners in town of Donetsk, Ukraine, plan one-day warning strike today, all-out walkout starting Tuesday if law to restrict workers' rights passes . . . first test of Prime Minister Kuchma's effort to halt economic slide. [Redacted]

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— Yel'tsin yesterday ordered all Russian agencies to clear international activities with Foreign Ministry . . . recently exhorted Ministry to become interagency leader . . . various officials protesting, want supraministerial coordination. [Redacted]

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Americas


— Guatemalan constitutional court has narrowly upheld President Serrano's recognition of Belize, says congressional ratification now necessary. [Redacted]

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13 November 1992



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Directorate
of Intelligence

Intelligence Memorandum
Office of East Asian Analysis
20 November 1992

South Korea: Outlook for the Presidential Race

[Redacted] (b)(3)

South Korean observers view ruling Democratic Liberal Party candidate Kim Young Sam as the frontrunner in the presidential election set for 18 December, but the vote will probably be close. While Kim is striving to convince all factions of his party to campaign vigorously for him in their home strongholds, Democratic Party candidate Kim Dae Jung is working to broaden his support by moderating his leftist image and downplaying his regional identification with his home base in the Cholla provinces. The third major candidate, former Hyundai chairman Chung Ju Yung, has injected color into the campaign, but even his own party concedes his chances are slim. He could, however, draw votes from Kim Young Sam and give Kim Dae Jung the victory. None of the contenders would be likely to dramatically change Seoul's domestic or foreign policy, including its policy of seeking gradual reunification with North Korea. The election's greatest impact, therefore, may well be to further the democratization process begun in 1987.

[Redacted] (b)(3)

This memorandum was prepared by [Redacted] Office of East Asian Analysis
[Redacted] Information available as of 19 November 1992 was used in its preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Northeast Asia Division, OEA, or [Redacted]

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President Roh Tae Woo is limited by South Korea's 1987 democratic reforms to a single five-year term. He had hoped to pave the way for an easy succession by another ruling party politician, but the upcoming presidential election could well be another close contest in which the winner gains only a plurality at the polls. The legal campaign period for the 18 December election begins 20 November--although the candidates in fact have been campaigning for months. [Redacted]

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Who Are the Candidates?

South Koreans see the election as the last battle for the presidency between "the two Kims"--the Democratic Liberal Party's Kim Young Sam, 64, and the Democratic Party's Kim Dae Jung, 66. As opposition politicians, both struggled against the repressive regimes of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, and both ran against Roh Tae Woo in the 1987 presidential election. Kim Young Sam subsequently jumped to the ruling camp, merging his party with Roh's in early 1990. Among several other candidates, the only serious contender is Chung Ju Yung, 77. The founder of the Hyundai Business Group, South Korea's second-largest conglomerate, Chung launched his United People's Party (UPP) in January, and his party was able to garner 17 percent of the vote in National Assembly elections only two months later (see appendix). [Redacted]

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How Fair Will the Election Be?

Since democratization began in late 1987, the South Korean public has generally viewed elections as relatively open and fair. [Redacted]

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Government intervention in the upcoming election may be lower for several reasons. Foremost are President Roh's actions this fall--resigning from the DLP himself and appointing a new prime minister and other cabinet members with no party affiliation. Roh declared he and the government would be neutral in order to fairly oversee the election. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Because of Roh's pledge and the public outcry over cases of interference during the runup to the legislative elections in March, moreover, the leadership of the security services and the military have also announced their neutrality. [Redacted]

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Roh and government officials probably will not remain entirely above the fray--indeed, the opposition criticized Roh in mid-November for ordering police to abduct his brother-in-law, a legislator, and then attempting to dissuade him from bolting the DLP.

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The DLP's local organizations probably are more extensive and better financed than those of the other parties--which should help mobilize votes for Kim Young Sam. Kim has been concerned about funding his campaign, nonetheless.

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Even without outside persuasion, businessmen will probably see him as the front runner and want to get aboard his bandwagon, in our judgment. Business contributors probably hope that, if Kim wins, they will be favored when the government awards contracts and other perks.

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Kim Dae Jung's Democratic Party has a strong regional base, but it is smaller than the DLP's. Kim's native Cholla provinces, together with a significant bloc of voters in Seoul--where many Cholla natives have migrated in recent years--account for about 25 percent of the electorate. Kim Dae Jung's main challenge is to overcome the perception that he is the standard bearer of a regional party.

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To be sure, Kim also draws support from some dissidents and students nationwide, because of his history of opposing authoritarian rule. But their support is eroding as Kim seeks to project a more moderate image to broaden his appeal with the middle class.

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In addition to having a smaller party organization, Kim Dae Jung is low on funding,

This was probably the main reason Kim fought for a recent change in the election law that increased the state subsidy to political campaigns,

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Chung Ju Yung's campaign strengths and deficiencies are the inverse of his rivals'. Aside from the city of Ulsan, where many Hyundai subsidiaries are located, Chung lacks a regional base. With a fortune some sources estimate at \$6.5 billion, however, he has ample money for his campaign and is apparently using Hyundai executives to staff his party organization. Chung fielded a surprisingly large number of legislative candidates in March, only a few months after the party's founding, suggesting he was able to use his resources to quickly create a network of local organizations. UPP officials are trying to preserve that network and organize groups in new areas.

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Moreover, the UPP may be able to expand its grassroots organization somewhat with the help of some former DLP officials who joined the UPP because of their opposition to Kim Young Sam.

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What Are the Campaign Issues?

Issues have been less important to voters in South Korean elections than regional loyalty, school ties, and family connections, but three campaign themes have been prominent this time--the economy, corruption, and the need to end regional antagonism. About 10 to 20 percent of the electorate is undecided. [Redacted] some media polls put this percentage at one-third of the electorate--and the candidates' handling of these issues may help to sway this group. [Redacted]

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The Economy. Polls during the year indicate that economic problems--especially inflation, a housing shortage, and the trade deficit--are the public's overriding concern. Each candidate is portraying himself as the one best qualified to manage the economy. Kim Young Sam has held highly publicized tutorial sessions with economists, probably in part seeking to convince voters that his economic advisers are more experienced than his competitors'. Kim Dae Jung, a one-time businessman, has detailed economic proposals in his speeches and reissued his book, *Mass Participatory Economy*, to show he is more knowledgeable on complex economic issues than Kim Young Sam. For his part, Chung Ju Yung cites his rags-to-riches business success to portray himself in speeches and interviews as the wise man needed to cure the nation's economic ills.

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[Redacted]

Rhetoric aside, however, the candidates' economic platforms are similar. Each pledges to lower inflation and provide affordable housing, according to press reports. To varying extents, the candidates also promise to curb excessive government intervention in the economy and to promote loans and other benefits for small businesses, which many South Koreans believe have suffered because of preferential government treatment of the conglomerates, or *chaebols*. Kim Dae Jung is stressing his view that the concentration of economic power in the *chaebols* works against equitable income distribution and undercuts smaller firms, which would be more innovative and respond faster to changes in the market. Chung Ju Yung advances similar ideas, probably to counteract the voters' suspicion that as a *chaebol* founder he would coddle big business. Kim Young Sam, for his part, has voiced only muted criticism of the *chaebols*, probably in part because many top executives are ruling-party stalwarts. [Redacted]

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Clean Politics. Strong public reaction to several land fraud scandals and incidents of vote-rigging in the March National Assembly elections has pushed the candidates to call for fairer political practices. All three are scoring the corruption--or "money politics"--that has pervaded South Korean political life. [Redacted]

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As the candidate of the incumbent party implicated in the scandals, Kim Young Sam has special reason to emphasize the clean politics theme. Kim has made the morality issue the centerpiece of his campaign, pledging to cure what he calls the "Korean disease."

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[redacted] he appears to be striking a responsive chord among many South Koreans, who believe their society suffers from an ethical malaise marked by corruption and an eroding work ethic. [redacted]

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Regionalism. Each candidate vows to ease longstanding regional rivalries, which many South Koreans blame for income inequalities and the confrontational nature of the country's politics. Traditionally, the group in power has tended to shower its regional base with government favors. The two Kims--whose home regions are fierce rivals--promise they will promote balanced economic development and appoint Cabinet ministers and other personnel from all regions, according to the press. UPP officials note their party is not strongly associated with a particular province--Chung Ju Yung was born in North Korea--and so is the group to overcome regionalism, according to press reports. Moreover, they add that the UPP was able to garner votes from a wide variety of areas in the March legislative elections. [redacted]

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What Are Observers Predicting?

Political observers generally expect a close race but agree Kim Young Sam is the frontrunner. [redacted]

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[redacted] If areas traditionally dominated by the DLP's factions cast a strong vote for Kim Young Sam--a long shot, in our view, given the party's history of factional discord--he could even win a majority. The key for both Kims will be to hold on to their traditional regional supporters and to make gains in Seoul. [redacted]

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Most observers estimate support for Chung Ju Yung is low--well under 10 percent, according to media polls--and even his own party members generally do not believe he has a chance of winning. Chung could draw votes from Kim Young Sam, however, especially in Seoul and North Kyongsang Province, where several well-known former DLP leaders have recently joined his party. [redacted]

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Kim Dae Jung supporters in the Democratic Party [redacted] hope splits in the usual DLP vote will give him the edge. The DP stalwarts hope that former DLP member Lee Jong Chan, who is the New Korea Party candidate, will make a strong run for the presidency in Seoul and erode Kim Young Sam's support there. They also hope for DLP voter defections to Chung Ju Yung--especially because some former DLP officials are now UPP members. [redacted] press reporting suggests, however, that backing from these officials is unlikely to draw much additional support for Chung. Many South Koreans view them with distrust [redacted] because they have connections to the authoritarian regime of former President Chun Doo Hwan. [redacted]

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What Difference Does the Election Make for South Korea?

This presidential election is likely to be more significant for the process of democratization in South Korea than for the direction of Seoul's policy. Each of the three major candidates is fairly conservative, and their policy differences are relatively minor. They all advocate a free market system and gradual steps toward peaceful reunification with North Korea, for example. [redacted]

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But, in several ways, the presidential election--the second since democratic reforms began in 1987--will be a milestone. It will strengthen the precedent for a peaceful transfer of power according to the constitution. And it may also bring about important changes in the nature of the country's leadership and its election practices:

- It will mark the first time in 30 years that South Korea has a president without a military background, reinforcing the civilian nature of the government.
- If the government and security services indeed interfere less than they have in the past, the election will help institutionalize a higher standard for electoral fairness.
- The election may also help loosen the grip of regional animosities by bringing to power a leader who is not a native of Taegu City in North Kyongsang Province, home of Park Chung Hee, Chung Doo Hwan, and Roh Tae Woo. [redacted]

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What Difference Does the Election Make for the United States?

Whoever becomes South Korea's next president will almost certainly want to maintain strong relations with Washington, in our view. All of the major candidates have emphasized the continuing value of political and security ties to the United States. They have all publicly stressed the role of US troops in the South in enhancing regional stability, for example. Moreover, each candidate has sought meetings with prominent US officials--Kim Dae Jung and Chung Ju Yung visited Washington this fall--seeing such contacts as a way to boost their own image as statesmen and enhance their prestige with voters. Indeed, since the US presidential election in early November, each candidate has publicly declared himself to be South Korea's "Clinton." [redacted]

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In the economic sphere, all three candidates no doubt realize the need for cooperation with the United States, South Korea's largest export market. They almost certainly recognize the need to gradually open markets in order to avoid trade retaliation and to acquire needed technology. Nonetheless, we believe they share concerns about US efforts to accelerate the pace of market liberalization. Kim Dae Jung in particular has

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suggested he would resist liberalization of the agricultural sector--particularly the rice market. While Kim Young Sam occasionally has said the farm sector should become more competitive by international standards, Kim Dae Jung--whose constituency includes a significant percentage of farmers--has more emphatically advocated higher state subsidies. [Redacted]


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
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
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


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Party Strongholds



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Tuesday, 15 December 1992




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15 December 1992


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NR Record

SOUTH KOREA: Presidential Race Tightens

With the election only three days off, support for frontrunning Democratic Liberal Party candidate Kim Young Sam remains soft in key areas.

[Redacted] Kim Dae Jung, the candidate of the main opposition Democratic Party, could win [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Kim Young Sam has renewed allegations that Kim Dae Jung is a Communist sympathizer. The third major candidate, Chung Ju Yung of the United People's Party, has announced his party's merger with the small New Korea Party. [Redacted]

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Comment: The race appears much closer than expected. Kim Young Sam's hardball rhetoric, coupled with an ongoing government investigation of Chung's funding, could backfire, bringing to voters' minds tactics of past authoritarian regimes. The merger of the two smaller parties in itself probably will not gain Chung many votes, but it will provide a psychological boost and help maintain the momentum his campaign has recently gained. The tight contest means the outcome probably will hinge on the youth vote—28 percent of voters are under age 30—and the undecided, widely estimated at more than 30 percent, most of whom are in the Seoul metropolitan area. [Redacted]

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
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


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
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
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20 May 1992

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
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South Korea: Presidential Candidate Nominated

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
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
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
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SOUTH KOREA: Presidential Candidate Nominated

South Korea's ruling Democratic Liberal Party yesterday nominated cochairman Kim Young Sam as its candidate for president. He received about two-thirds of the convention votes



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His only rival, Assemblyman Lee Jong Chan, withdrew his candidacy on Sunday but still received roughly one-third of the vote.


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
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Comment: Kim's success in the presidential race will depend largely on his ability to get rival faction members, including those who only lukewarmly supported his nomination, to campaign vigorously for him. He needs their full effort, especially to overcome regional animosities between voters in North Kyongsang Province and those in his South Kyongsang home base. Kim's political acumen and President Roh's diplomatic skills, which have kept the faction-ridden DLP essentially intact so far, should help to encourage intraparty cooperation.



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NR Record


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
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Director of Central Intelligence

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

Saturday, 16 May 1992



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
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
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In Brief

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
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16 May 1992

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East Asia

— South Korea's Unification National Party yesterday nominated founder Chung Ju Yung as presidential candidate . . . ensures at least three-way contest in election late this year . . . could draw votes from ruling-party candidate.



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16 May 1992



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
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South Korea



President-Elect Kim Young Sam

Kim has achieved political success through his ability to reach compromises and to mend fences with political enemies.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] he has

long maintained good relations with US officials

[Redacted]

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Kim's political skills are buttressed by an impressive political organization. He has numerous advisers with specialties varying from women's issues to international economic policy. He is regarded as having one of the best advisory teams among Seoul's politicians.

Kim, 65, has substantial wealth and is well connected. He was born in Pusan, South Korea's second-largest city, and has been active in politics since the early 1950s. Kim speaks some English.



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Special Analysis


SOUTH KOREA: Kim Young Sam Wins Presidency

The victory by Kim Young Sam, leader of the Democratic Liberal Party, in yesterday's presidential election reflects the conservative public's preference for stability. 


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With more than 97 percent of the vote in, Kim reportedly won with 42 percent of the vote; the Democratic Party candidate, Kim Dae Jung, received 34 percent, and Chung Ju Yung of the United People's Party received 16 percent. Election day was peaceful, and turnout was high at 82 percent. Moreover, press reports indicate the public generally believes that the election was fair—especially, as compared with the one in 1987—which will strengthen the precedent for a peaceful transfer of power in line with the Constitution. Although charges of irregularities may arise later, Kim's comfortable margin of victory will undercut sustained challenges to the outcome. Kim Dae Jung's prompt concession reduces the likelihood of protests by his supporters. 


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Despite their concern about current economic problems, most South Koreans apparently were unwilling to risk electing a figure whose party is inexperienced in managing national political and economic affairs. Most probably also concluded that the country needs a president whose party has a majority in the National Assembly. 

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As in the past, regional rivalries played the key role in the voting. Kim Dae Jung's support came almost exclusively from the Cholla provinces in the southwest and from Cholla natives in Seoul. Ruling DLP officials increasingly appealed to regional loyalties late in the campaign to shore up soft support in their own constituencies. 

(b)(3)

Kim probably will use the time before he is inaugurated in late February to mend fences in his faction-plagued party. His strong showing may encourage legislators from other parties to join the DLP, a common occurrence in South Korea. Kim is likely to adopt policies broadly similar to those of outgoing President Roh, including maintaining close political and security ties to Washington and opening South Korea's markets only gradually. He probably will also continue to promote a dialogue with North Korea as a means toward eventual peaceful reunification of the Peninsula. 

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19 December 1992



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Directorate of Intelligence

10 June 1992

East Asia Notes: South Korea: Presidential Race Begins

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South Korea's three major presidential hopefuls are already launching their campaigns for this winter's election, and the race is likely to be intense.

recent speeches, Chung has stressed his business acumen will enable him to strengthen South Korea's economy, but it is unclear if his experience will be an asset or a liability with voters. Many South Koreans resent the power of conglomerates such as Hyundai and fear Chung would coddle big business.

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Democratic Liberal Party candidate Kim Young Sam's biggest challenge will be to unify the ruling party behind him. Kim faced stiff resistance to his nomination from the members of two other factions, and his rival for the nomination is hinting he may yet run as an independent. Kim is trying to mend fences in the DLP by appointing some of his rivals to party posts as he puts together his campaign, according to press reports. At the same time, he must work to reassure the public he can handle major issues.

The presidential vote must be held between 17 December 1992 and 25 January 1993--an exact date will be selected after interparty consultations--and a clear frontrunner has not yet emerged in opinion polls. Ruling party candidate Kim Young Sam undoubtedly hopes the public's traditional desire for stability will work to his advantage. Chung Ju Yung will try to boost his prospects by exploiting widespread public sentiment that it is time for the "two Kims" to retire from politics. For his part, Kim Dae Jung may calculate Chung Ju Yung will draw enough votes away from the ruling party to enable him to win with a plurality of votes in the multicandidate race.

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Kim Dae Jung--candidate of the largest opposition party--is campaigning hard on economic themes, but he must overcome his reputation as a leftist who cannot win outside his home province. Kim is trying to moderate his image by recruiting former Army officers to join his party and endorsing the continued presence of US troops in South Korea even after reunification, according to press reports. Kim contends his party's strong showing in Seoul in the March National Assembly election proves he is not merely a regional candidate.

(b)(3)

Meanwhile, Chung Ju Yung--the former Hyundai chairman who formed the Unification National Party in January--is the new face in the campaign who must convince voters he is a viable candidate. Chung's party won a surprising 17 percent of the vote in the Assembly election, and the billionaire has the money and organization to run a strong national campaign. In

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Produced by [redacted]
Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, NEA Division, OEA,

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