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Autumn 2014 Issue

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Marine Corps Intelligence Association, Incorporated



20th ANNIVERSARY OF THE 1994 INTELLIGENCE PLAN

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The Marine Corps Intelligence Association, Incorporated

The MCIA, Inc., is a non-profit, war veterans organization exempt from Federal Tax per Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c) (19), primarily comprised of regular, reserve, retired, and former intelligence Marines. Incorporated on 10 November 1993, the MCIA, Inc., strives to achieve the following:

- To promote professionalism within the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E) through collective action.
- To foster fraternal relations and provide useful services to members of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E).
- To continue to serve the Nation, the Marine Corps, and the Intelligence Community.

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238th Year of Our Corps

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INTSUM Back Issues:

<http://www.mcia-inc.org/INTSUMS.html>

On the cover: Undated photograph of Federal Building #2, the "Navy Annex," which used to house Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. It represents the facility very closely to what it looked like at the time the 1994 U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Plan was conceived and approved. The Navy Annex has since been demolished to make way for the expansion of Arlington National Cemetery.



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July 2014

Dear Marines and Friends of Marines,

Every day is a good day to be a Marine. With the whole world seemingly falling apart around us, it is a really good time to be an Intelligence Marine. I am pleased and excited about the last *INTSUM* Spring/Summer issue. Our enterprise has great stories to tell, and *INTSUM* is well-postured to capture them. Bravo Zulu to the Marines of III MEF for sharing the lessons of OPERATION DAMAYAN with us, and to Tim White for clearly articulating a better approach to achieving the high standards of professionalization we seek. Please keep writing and posting, Marines!

Many of you have read the DIRINT Strategic Intent, and I encourage you to re-read it if you get a chance. The bottom line is 'change.' Our threats are changing, our missions are changing, our CONOPs are changing, technology is changing, and the human capital we turn into Marine Intelligence professionals is changing too. All of these threads lead you to one place...the need for our Intelligence Enterprise to change. Our evolution will only be real, however, to the extent that we -- all of us in the Marine intelligence community -- take ownership of the transformation of our enterprise. A life of comfortable irrelevance is not in the Marine Corps DNA. We seek enduring relevance on the modern battlefield, even if it makes us uncomfortable at times. The challenges to enterprising our capabilities are many; yet, the opportunities are compelling. The risks of returning to the status-quo of pre-9/11 are too high to accept.

Our intelligence enterprise is yours and mine, but mostly it belongs to the Marines who will follow in our footsteps. The enterprise we leave behind must be better than the one we inherited. Please ask yourself what you can do to make things better. Help us generate enterprise solutions to local challenges. Then... grab an oar!

For all, you'll soon see a new ISR Plan published. This document moves past the enterprise vision and strategic intent, and has some implementation steps (many of which are well underway.) We will also articulate many of the next steps in this multi-generational transformation. The MAGTF Intelligence Center symposium is coming soon, as is a relook at the way we train analysts and intelligence officers. We can discuss these and other topics here in the *INTSUM*, or on our intellink shared media outlet, also coming soon.

Lastly, the *INTSUM* has long been one of the tools we use to communicate about our profession. For the past couple of years our editor, Eric Walters, has been the 'man behind the curtain,' teaching and mentoring all who were smart enough to listen. To my generation of officers, he holds 'living legend' status as a fount of military wisdom and thought-provoking intelligence dialogue. Eric – we thank you for your years of patient service as a warrior and mentor. We'll miss you as the editor, but suspect we might see you hanging around the bar at a future OAG. Best of luck...and Semper Fidelis.

Semper Fidelis,
DIRINT



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July 2014

Dear intelligence Marine or civilian,

There's an expression circulating in DoD to describe these times. It's even been embodied in an EXORD - The "New Normal."

Often described as starting with the attack on Ambassador Stevens in Benghazi, the New Normal posits a era of cascading crises: Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Iraq and so on. This era may well be characterized by extremely rapid response to low-profile violent actions by small forces that are highly dependent on intelligence, including cyber.

Marines growing up in the New Normal may well have a hard time imagining the worldview of Post 9/11 Iraq-Afghanistan Marines, Cold War Marines, Post Viet Nam, Viet Nam, etc. while those of us who have suddenly become "old timers" are left wondering what has actually changed. Well, it has. MEUs these days seem almost guaranteed to fly long distances into multiple complex nightmares, either natural or manmade.

As an association, we are heading into our own "New Normal" with the objective of bringing intel Marines from all eras together. As a group we have the strongest basis for association that I've seen. That's why you should join if you aren't a member. One of the things crucial to uniting Marines of different eras will be our History and Heritage program. Col Kathleen Harrision USMC (Ret.) has volunteered to take charge of it and will describe her plan in the next issue. Guess what? There are only two groups this is relevant to: (1) New Normal intel Marines and (2) everyone else. And we will have succeeded once there is a section on intelligence in the National Museum of the Marine Corps.

This summer will be busy once again. You can expect to see new ID cards in the mail soon and a new directory in the fall. We will support Intel Department's Fall Operational Advisory Group (OAG) 15-19 September and start the Speakers Program with the Institute of World Politics that month as well.

My last word is for Eric Walters, to whom editing comes as easily as breathing (perhaps after a PFT). Thanks for elevating the stature of the INTSUM to a professional publication and cracking that most elusive of goals, that of having an issue with a majority of active duty contributors. Quality, quantity and participation. Says it all.

Semper Vigilans!

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Fritz J. Barth".

Fritz J. Barth
Col USMCR (Ret.)

◆ **Founded: 5 June 1993** ◆ **Incorporated: 10 November 1993** ◆ **www.mcia-inc.org** ◆

From the Editor:

A Major Step Forward—Seen From Twenty Years Later

On the 2nd of March 1994, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Walter E. Boomer, approved a wide-ranging plan to improve Marine Corps Intelligence as presented by the Director of Intelligence, then-Major General Paul K. Van Riper. The provisions of the plan were published in ALMAR 100/95, released a little over a year later. As a newly-promoted 0202 major working in the C4I Department, HQMC, from mid-1993 to mid-1994, I could not have realized that the plan would turn out to be such a significant marker in my own career, dividing my 29 years into two nearly equal halves. Many of us still timeline our major experiences as happening either "before" or "after the Van Riper Plan." We are lucky and grateful to have a former DIRINT and Assistant DIRINT, Mike Decker, provide us with his impressions on how the plan was implemented during his years at HQMC. He also generously provided us with the 2004 Senate Armed Services Committee testimony, written by Colonel Kate Prokop, along with accompanying slides, which are not shown here. The full set and other material are available through the MCIA, Inc., Social Website.

A number of stalwart *INTSUM* authors have once again contributed articles for this issue. Jim Howcroft outlines his thoughts about balancing staff and command functions in executing intelligence operations. Lieutenant Colonel Mike Reilly takes on the *MCDP 2* intelligence functions and proposes new ones. We also continue with the middle part of Captain Troy Mitchell's "The Chechen Flea" serialized case on intelligence analysis supporting counter-terrorist operations, from a uniquely Russian point of view. This issue also returns to a more traditional book review format as two works on man-hunting notorious al Qaeda terrorists are compared with each other.

This is my last issue as the *INTSUM* Editor. Before I took the reins, there was debate that MCIA, Inc., could continue publishing the *INTSUM* as a magazine; the leadership at the time was considering making it a newsletter instead. The resurgence of the magazine and its transformation into a more professionally-oriented publication would not have been possible without the top-flight authors providing quality material such as you've seen in these pages. I am particularly grateful as this enabled us to maintain a regular publishing schedule—five single issues and three double-sized ones for a total of eight magazines—over the last two years. Indeed, with this Autumn 2014 *INTSUM* we are ahead of the publication timeline for a change! I thank our corporate sponsors and dues-paying members who have consistently provided the critical financial resources to ensure this magazine remains a feasible endeavor. The Editorial Board members and additional proofreaders have made this job immeasurably easier as well. Lastly, I want to specifically recognize Curtis Hoessly and Allegra Marketing Print Mail of Virginia Beach, Virginia; he and his crew handle the hardcopy physical reproduction and mailing for us and have done a consistently outstanding job!

You'll still see pieces from me here on occasion when the next Editor takes over. As of this writing that position remains vacant and I ask those of you with a literary bent to volunteer. Now that I have finished transitioning this past year from a defense contractor job in Virginia Beach to an Army assistant professorship at Fort Lee, I intend to focus my volunteer time into rejuvenating the MCIA, Inc., Social Website. I'd ask all of you to join the MCIA, Inc., Social Website and contribute there as well as to the *INTSUM* – as your professional fora – to promote the MCISRE community.

Best wishes and Semper Fidelis,
-- Eric M. Walters



**Intelligence Plan
Implementation: 1994-2008**
Michael H. Decker

Marine Corps Intelligence emerged from Desert Storm with a slightly battered reputation. Much of this was undeserved and none of it was because of individual Intel Marines who performed valiantly. Rather, it was due to a systematic approach to the intelligence function by the Marine Corps that left the Marine Intelligence occupational field under-manned, under-trained, and under-equipped at the end of the 1980s. That was the force we took to OPERATION DESERT SHIELD in late 1990 and, subsequently, OPERATION DESERT STORM in early 1991. As one September 1991 Marine Corps Gazette article by an Intelligence Marine summed it up: “Unfortunately, We Fought Like We Trained.”¹

The intent behind the 1994 Intelligence Plan was to make Intelligence be like the rest of the functional areas and Occupational Fields (OccFlds) in the Marine Corps. Until 1994, Marine Corps Intelligence had been treated as special or different. As a result, Marine Intelligence often sought to accomplish the impossible while remaining misunderstood by much of the Corps.

For example, in the late 1970s we began accessing one or two-dozen regular officer lieutenants every year from The Basic School. This approach would certainly not yield the 20 intelligence colonels we needed on deck 24 years later, so we took mid-to-late career lateral moves or had limited duty officer (LDO) lieutenant colonels in G2 billets dealing with colonel counterparts in G3, G6, C/S, etc. Junior to their staff principal colleagues and with ill-defined career progression, these LDOs and lateral movers inevitably hit a glass ceiling in terms of effectiveness and influence despite their dedication and hard work.

Making intelligence like other OccFlds meant asking for 90 lieutenants a year to ensure constant manning at 20 colonels. The plan worked: in FY86 there were 358 intelligence officers on active duty, including all regulars, LDOs, and WOs. By 2006, there were 975 intelligence officers on active duty.



Briefing the Iraqi ground force disposition during the Persian Gulf War. Then-Brigadier General P.K. Van Riper characterized tactical intelligence as “the weakest area” he observed.

Intelligence Manpower

The Intelligence Plan sought to improve the training and education of intelligence Marines in order to make personnel assignments more predictable and less personality dependent. The goal of the Intelligence Plan was to grow intelligence Marines as a homogenous commodity while accommodating intelligence practice as both art and science. There was also a need to get away from a longstanding view of Marine Intel, often held by our commanders, that all intelligence people are bad except for my S2/team/unit, usually based in part on loyalty and in part on focused training and mentoring. The goal was to create and perpetuate a perception that all intelligence Marines are proficient and professional until otherwise demonstrated. It was not just commanders that caused this problem; intelligence Marines were doing this to themselves regularly, decrying the G2/S2 staffs of higher, adjacent, and supporting units as incompetent rather than viewing MAGTF intelligence as a corporate enterprise or team sport.

In 1994, active duty Marine Corps Intelligence had 478 officers and 2,642 enlisted 02XX and 26XX Marines. (02XX were general military intelligence analysts, CI/HUMINT, Topographic/Imagery MOSs, while 26XX were Signals Intelligence Marines.) The enlisted problem was viewed simply as not enough 02XXs, while the officer problem was training and career progression. The 1994 Intelligence Plan called for an 11% growth in enlisted structure; little of that growth went into the 26XX OccFld, so the 02XX growth was actually 24%. Officers grew by 40 billets; 24 were

conversions for billets in Recon units, and regimental S2s grew from 2 off/ 4 enl to 4 off/ 8 enl. The Intelligence Plan called for taking about 90 officers each year from TBS and putting them into four entry-level Intelligence MOS school tracks ranging from 19-29 weeks and another 14 weeks of mid-career training. Concurrent with the development of the Intelligence Plan, the Marine Corps conducted a Restricted Officer Program Study (ROPS) that recommended converting most LDO billets to regular officer structure.

As a result, the Intelligence Plan eliminated LDOs and reduced WOs to create over 117 new lieutenant 02XX billets. The goal was for 02XX lieutenants to have Capt 0202s as Reporting Seniors during their first tour, again following the model in the rest of the Corps where new lieutenants work for captains of the same MOS during their first operating force tour. Early versions of the Intel Plan brief mischaracterized the initial problem as a “lack of a professional occupational field,” but we were able to articulate the distinction between the professional individual officers and the faulty structure and training tracks they were often shoehorned into which didn't fit the typical senior-subordinate model in the rest of the Corps. In the final published versions of the Intelligence Plan, this issue was described as “no defined career progression for intelligence officers.”

A minor administrative fix was executed to assist in recruiting entry-level Intelligence Marines. To reach a sustainable manning “steady state,” Marine Intel needed about 600 new recruits per year given the Corps' pre-9/11 end strength. Over time, Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) had decided to give all SigInt (26XX) recruits the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) test. The difficulty of the DLAB resulted in not meeting the annual recruiting goal. Only about a third of the 26XX recruits actually went to the Defense Language Institute (DLI); the other two thirds would serve as signals analysts and special communicators with no need for language aptitude. Once we instituted a fix and gave only 267X (cryptolinguist) recruits the DLAB, we began hitting our goals. With further Intel growth post-9/11, the annual steady state recruiting number

moved to about 800, with over 1,000 in FY08 due to 202K growth which will also be discussed later. By 2008, the newly-created Marine Corps Intelligence Schools (MCIS) command was bursting at the seams with new Marines.

There were annual bureaucratic “knife fights” by the DirInt’s OccFld sponsor staff. It seemed every year we thought we had agreement set in stone on how many recruits Marine Intelligence would get, how many school seats we’d be authorized in the annual Training Input Plan (TIP), and what the enlisted staffing goal model (ESGM) would do to Intelligence units and staffs. But then we’d find an “iron major” in another department making an adjustment to these without understanding the big picture. OccFld sponsor work, like camouflage, is continuous.

Intel Plan Paper Trail

Although the Intel Plan was approved in March 1994, implementation began immediately in areas such as training. Broad publication and implementation began in FY95, spelled out in the April 1995 issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette* in an article entitled “The Future of Marine Corps Intelligence.” By that time, the March

Concept-Based Requirements System (CBRS). This required an Intelligence Functional Concept, which was signed by the DirInt on 18 Jan 95. The Intelligence Plan mission statement was used verbatim in the functional concept and the 7 principles from the original 1994 Intelligence Plan briefs and the ALMAR were reiterated in the functional concept:

- 1- The focus is tactical intelligence
- 2- The intelligence focus must be downward
- 3- Intelligence drives operations
- 4- The intelligence effort must be directed and managed by a multi-discipline trained and experienced Intelligence officer
- 5- Intelligence staffs use intelligence, Intelligence organizations produce intelligence
- 6- The intelligence product must be timely and tailored to both the unit and its mission
- 7- The last step in the Intelligence cycle is utilization, not dissemination

One other part of the paper trail was the publication of a capstone doctrinal publication on

“There were annual bureaucratic ‘knife fights’ by the DirInt’s Occfld Sponsor staff. . . . OccFld Sponsor work, like camouflage, is continuous.”

1995 ALMAR 100/95 detailing the plan had been published and received. The ALMAR reiterated the Intel Plan mission statement: “Provide commanders, at every level, with seamless, tailored, timely, minimum essential intelligence and ensure this intelligence is integrated into the operational planning process.” The ALMAR identified the six fundamental deficiencies the Intel Plan was designed to address:

- 1- Inadequate doctrinal foundation
- 2- No defined career progression for intelligence officers
- 3- Insufficient tactical intelligence support
- 4- Insufficient joint manning
- 5- Insufficient language capability
- 6- Inadequate imagery capability

While the concept had been approved, there was also some backfilling paperwork to do. The combat development process at the time was called the

through 1995 and 1996, resulting in the 7 June 1997 publication of MCDP-2 *Intelligence*.

The “paper chase” continued annually as various changes in administrations and combat development processes changed over the years. In June 2003, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed use of a Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). The Intel policy and programs staff at Intelligence Department teamed with the newly created Intelligence Integration Division (IID) at MCCDC to draft a JCIDS-compliant Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) on the Marines Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise (MCISR-E, often pronounced “McScissors” and — eventually — “McScissoree”). The MCISR-E ICD was approved by JCS in May 2007 and returned to the Marine Corps for sponsor validation and approval, granted by ACMC in April 2008.

Intelligence Battalion (IntelBn)

The second half of ALMAR 100/95's item number 5 "Intelligence staffs use intelligence, Intelligence organizations produce intelligence" was key to fixing one of the major "Irish pennants" left dangling under the Intelligence Plan, the creation of an Intelligence Battalion (IntelBn) in each MEF. While this had been on the briefing slides when ACMC had approved the Intel Plan, it was set aside for further study and the IntelBn Direct Support Teams (DST), a major part of the 02XX billet increase, were placed onto the T/Os of the G2 sections of Div (5 DSTs), MAW (5 DSTs), and FSSG (1 DST).

As we began to attack this issue in 1995, we found there had actually been three potential IntelBn courses of action (COA) debated in the back rooms: (1) Move the existing IntelCo to RadBn and rename it IntelBn, (2) Merge the existing IntelCo and Force Recon Co to form an IntelBn, and (3) Form an IntelBn using the existing IntelCo and new DST structure. The "engineers" knew the path of least resistance was COA 1, the practitioners knew the Recon community was not ready for COA 2, and all the Intelligence professionals knew COA 3 was both the optimal and the hardest to achieve.

The requirement for an IntelBn was expressed in terms of improving training and readiness and therefore improving the MAGTF's combat capability. Most agreed the old system of a CIT at each MEB or base, an IIP and SCAMP in Div HQ Bn, and the FIU in MAW resulted in uneven training and readiness over time, since it was dependent on the personality and capability of the incumbent OICs and Chiefs.



MCDP-2 *Intelligence* was years in the making, providing a doctrinal foundation for this warfighting function that was congruent with MCDP-1 *Warfighting*, the controversial MCDP-6 *Command and Control*, and the other "white books" in the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication series.

However, the IntelCo created under the SRIG did not go far enough as it created a company-level entity that did not have the battalion staff and authority that were resident in similar combat support entities like Radio Battalion (RadBn) and Communications Battalion (CommBn).

Unfortunate surprises were often encountered in the push to create IntelBns. Many of our senior Intel officers had not held command billets and were uncomfortable with the lanes in the road that an Intel G-level staff and a separate IntelBn command would require. In July of 1995, the senior intelligence officer at the MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP) floated a proposal to not follow any of the COAs above and to divide up the IntelCo assets among the MEF, Div, and MAW G2s, returning to the pre-SRIG model. We also had intelligence officers that were unwilling to establish a bare bones IntelBn and let it grow, preferring instead an all-or-nothing face-off with the USMC manpower and force structure processes.

In April 1996, DirInt published a draft Intelligence Battalion Concept of Employment (COE), recommending IntelBn stand ups in 1997. The draft COE called for an IntelBn with four companies: Headquarters and Services (H&S), Intelligence, CI/HUMINT, and Force Recon. DirInt's COE was careful to note MarForLant supported inclusion of Force Recon Co while MarForPac did not. This led to some experimenting on options with Force Recon in or out that further delayed the stand-up of the IntelBns across the operating force.

Finally, in October 1998, MCCDC message 021400Z OCT 98 directed via McBul 5400 the 1999 stand-up of IntelBns with three companies, HQ Co, P&A Co, and CI/HUMINT Co. Some MEF CGs stood up their IntelBns in early 1999 and others waited until later. Intelligence Dept was still working on the IntelBn T/O cover page, including the mission statement and tasks, throughout 1999. Final agreement was reached on the T/O cover page during the July 1999 G2 Conference at Nellis, AFB, NV. Coincidentally, in July 1999 the SRIGs were redesignated MEF Headquarters Groups (MHG).

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)

The Intelligence Plan also identified “insufficient joint manning” as a fundamental deficiency. Since true “joint” billets were a function of JCS J1-approved joint tables of distribution (JTD), this item really had more to do with MCIA manpower and potential employment of Marines at MCIA’s counterpart Service intelligence organizations. It also had to do with how MCIA evolved from a small team supporting MCCDC and SysCom to a true Service Intelligence organization along the lines of ONI, AFISRA, or INSCOM. In the end, we only created a small Marine Detachment for NGIC in Charlottesville.

The ground work for separating MCIA from ONI within the National Intelligence Program (NIP, or NFIP—National Foreign Intelligence Program--as it was called then) was begun before 1994, when MCIA was established as a separate Expenditure Unit (EU) within the DoN General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) budget. Once that was done, the adding of resources to MCIA and the eventual breakout of MCIA

MCIA an overarching command with three subordinate units: Production and Analysis Company (P&A Co), CI/HUMINT Support Company (CIHSCo), and the recently renamed Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion (MCSB).

CMC also directed that MCIA become the administrative home for as many Intel Marines in joint billets as possible. For example, Marines at the Defense Intelligence Agency – to include those belonging to the Defense Attaché Service – are administratively assigned to MCIA. This CMC decision followed a briefing by MCIA and MCSB (then MSB) to CMC on the role each organization played in supporting Task Force 58, a unit that — at any one time – comprised of two MEU(SOC)s that deployed to Afghanistan in 2001-2 for Operation Enduring Freedom. Based on a DirInt recommendation, CMC immediately directed renaming of MSB and the reorganization of MCIA, further directing the message be prepared for his personal signature.

“Looking at MCIA in 2009 with 187 civilians, it is hard to believe there were less than 20 in 1994.”

into multiple EUs was possible. Looking at MCIA in 2009 with 187 civilians, it is hard to believe there were less than 20 in 1994. In fact, on 23 Oct 95 there was a meeting between the Asst DirInt, ExDir ONI, DDR(DI) DIA, and the DIA CFO to discuss “doubling” the size of MCIA by adding 18 GDIP civilian billets, which we received. Over the next 10 years, the Intelligence Department staff watched for opportunities to add a few bits of structure here and there to MCIA to bolster its size and capability. It would also provide DirInt a reserve of intelligence capability comparable (given our size) to that available to the other Service intel directors. The one major increase to MCIA’s uniformed Marine manpower that occurred during this period was the realignment of the Marine Corps Imagery Support Unit (MCISU) from Camp Pendleton to MCIA in 2000/2001.

In February 2001 MCIA was designated a command by CMC (MARADMIN 079/01 161230Z FEB 01). MCIA remained primarily a service production and analysis center until the summer of 2002 when CMC directed an MCIA Reorganization (R311433Z JUL 02) that made

Intelligence Structure--Ups with Few Downs

Manpower is the most important thing in the Marine Corps. How that manpower is recruited, organized, equipped, and trained to become combat capability is CMC’s Title 10 turf. Every CMC has a major structure review at least once, if not twice, during his tour.

In the summer of 1997 we had the Force Structure Review Group (FSRG). The group was chaired by a Marine MajGen with a charter to fix low operating force manning levels by cutting T/Os, mostly in the supporting establishment. CMC felt that over time too many billets had been added to T/O’s without compensatory reductions, resulting an overall percentage drop in manning levels. In June 1997, the Assistant DirInt--along with the Dir MCIA and the CO MCSB (then MSB)--briefed the FSRG. MCSB was clearly in the FSRGs sights since it was not well understood and appeared to be a large target. The FSRG recommended a 10% cut to MCSB. Fortunately,

over the years, Marine generals who had commanded MEU(SOC)s or been in certain joint billets knew what NSA did for MAGTFs. At the Sept 1997 General Officer Symposium (GOS), one MarFor CG spoke up from the crowd in opposition to a cut to MCSB and CMC took it off the list.

In the winter of 1999, CMC established a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG). Unlike the 1997 look at cuts only, the FSPG looked hard at both cuts and capability gaps. Fortunately, the FSPG was formed with broad representation and Intelligence Department was able to get the MarForPac G2 and the Branch Head for Intel personnel (IOP, formerly INTM) on the staff. This FSPG resulted in some minor but important additions to IntelBns in the areas of all-source fusion and collection management, as well as giving each IntelBn a much needed supply and motor transport NCO.

During 2000, the Intelligence Department staff, especially SigInt Branch (IPS, formerly INTS), was busy with several major structure and training issues. One was developing the plan to establish a 3rd RadBn in Hawaii while moving 1st RadBn to Camp Pendleton, CA. Another was the role of Marines in “network warfare,” leading to a Marine Requirements Oversight Council (MROC) brief in July 2000 and the reactivation of Co L, MCSB, in October 2000 to give MCSB a letter company focused on network exploitation.

Following Operation Iraqi Freedom I (OIF I), the Commandant directed an OIF Lessons Learned Force Structure Review Group (FSRG). DirInt submitted a letter dated 16 Sep 05 as the OccFld sponsor on Intelligence Structure Requirements based on OIF/OEF Lessons Learned, asking for an added 22 Active Component (AC) officers and 218 AC enlisted Marines. The FSRG actually increased AC intelligence manning by 6% (24/272 AC). The additions included 2 x 0231s added to each InfBn S2, adding 1 x 0211 to every CI/HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET), adding TROJAN SPIRIT teams to IntelBn H&S Co, adding IPB teams, Fusion Officers, and Senior Watch Officers (SWOs) to the IntelBn P&A Companies. The biggest portion of the 24/272 required a follow-up brief to CMC on the need for more 0231s in the IntelBns. The DirInt proposed adding 100 x 0231s to the IntelBns (40 each CONUS IntelBn and 20 for 3rd IntelBn) to

serve somewhat in General Support, with an emphasis on secondary language training for service with HETs. A follow-up briefing for CMC did secure these 100 billets to round out the 272 total. Given experiences with OIF I Reserve Component (RC) Intel mobilization, DirInt pushed hard to implement the creation of an RC Intelligence Support Battalion (ISB) and CMC approved both that and an increase of RC Intel by 25% (54/255 RC). Although creating this RC ISB had been in the works for some time, the OIF Lessons Learned FSRG put it across the line.

In October 2005, the Marine Corps was given approval to create a component command to SOCOM, the Marine Corps Special Operations Command, or MARSOC. In the May 2006 budget decision documents, the Marines Corps was directed to move 2,443 “program 2” (general purpose) billets to “program 11” (SOF). About 250 of those billets were intelligence Marines. 2,290 billets went to MARSOC itself and 153 went to various SOF staff positions at SOCOM HQ and the theater special operations commands (TSOCs). An Intel Co was created in MARSOC. The concept of employment was for MARSOC to deploy companies called MSOCs, with the Intel Co providing a 10-12 man Direct Support Team (DST) with each MSOC.



Colonel Mark Aycock, a former 1st Radio Battalion Commander in OIF I, served as the Commanding Officer of the Marine Special Operations Support Group, July 2007 – May 2009.

Following Operation Iraqi Freedom II (OIF II), the Commandant directed a more detailed review than the OIF I FSRG to completely assess all capabilities of the MAGTF and recommend realignments. The group was called the Capabilities Assessment Group (CAG) and was chaired by a MajGen. Again, this was a large staff

and several quality Intel Marines served on the CAG. The DirInt again submitted a detailed letter on Intel capability shortfalls. On 15 March 2006, the DirInt was able to personally brief the entire CAG staff. The DirInt expressed a need for over 1,000 additional intelligence Marines and received a favorable response.

During 2006, as the CAG was wrapping up its report, CMC decided--given the deployment tempo (DepTempo) caused by OIF/OEF--that the USMC would need to grow to about 202,000 ("202K") active end strength or reduce deployments to get to 1:2 "dwell" (meaning whether you deployed to OIF/OEF for 12 months or 7 months, you'd respectively get 24 or 14 months at home station between deployments). SecDef agreed to the 202K. CMC reworked the CAG report to develop the 202K "grow the force" initiative.

IntelBn and RadBn were at less than 1:1 dwell in 2006 and the 202K team recommended creating a 4th IntelBn and 4th RadBn to get those units to 1:2 dwell. CG MarForCom recommended adding more companies and platoons to the existing Intel Bns and Rad Bns so even if the Bn flags were at 1:1 the dwell rate of the individual Marines could go to 1:2. CMC approved the MarForCom proposal. The end result grew Intel Marines by about 1,200 billets to 6,222. Grand totals meant about 25% growth in structure on top of 56% real growth that occurred 94-06. Each Inf Bn received an S2A and 4 x 0231's to support the company level intelligence cell (CLIC) program. As part of the 202K growth CMC-approved re-instatement of the 0205 warrant officer program, but as a senior analyst and not as an S2A or generic tactical intelligence officer. 1st and 2nd Intel Bns nearly doubled in size and added a P&A Supt Co and a CIHS Co. Each Rad Bn added another SigInt company equivalent.

Reestablishing Intelligence Department

In the summer of 1999, the incoming CMC requested a briefing on the pros and cons of establishing a separate Intel Dept in HQMC. At the time Intel was a Division within C4I Dept. Intel Division prepared a briefing, received DirInt (also the AC/S C4I) approval, and then briefed ACMC in August and CMC on 17 Sept 1999. CMC asked for the brief

to be presented to every General Officer in the Corps during the GOS which was meeting the following week (20-24 Sept). The Asst DirInt took the show on the road and hit all of the breakout meeting rooms, getting all of the GOs 10-20 at a time. The GOs were generally supportive, perhaps because the cost was very low by design to ensure support. The BGen billet was on the T/O but vacant and we asked only for an admin officer and a secretary to break away from C4I Dept.

CMC eventually approved the stand-up of a separate Intel Dept on 23 Jan 2000 and formally announced his decision in ALMAR 021/00(270849Z APR 00). In ALMAR 021/00 CMC said "I hope all Marines will recognize both the emblematic and practical significance of the Commandant having a 'G2' who can serve as both a proponent for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance inside the combat development process and as the focal point for leveraging Intelligence Community support for our warfighting capability."

A related action was the adjustment of U.S. Navy Regulations, in which the Secretary of the Navy had long ago delegated authority for all intelligence matters in the DoN to CNO. Intel Dept staff worked through the long bureaucratic process to effect a change and in ALNAV 007/01 (R291919Z JAN 01) the Navy Regulations (Navy Regs) were changed to give CMC authority for intelligence within the Marine Corps.

In 2003 the SecDef created an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD/I) and in 2004 the billets of Director for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) were separated, with the latter renamed the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Dealing with these new staffs, while dealing with the more important internal USMC staff processes, created a challenge for our small Intel Dept staffs. Through normal staff actions we were able to add a few more uniformed Marines to the staff, but true relief began in 2008 when the Intel Dept staff successfully lobbied ACMC to add 21 civilian billets to the Intel Dept.

In addition to actions changing the Navy Regs, other small issues in the Department of the Navy

were policed up. For example, some SecNav Instructions referred to CNO(N2) as the DoN Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community (SOIC). The Intel Dept staff pointed out to DoN lawyers that per 50 USC 401a and EO 12333 the DirInt was in fact the USMC SOIC. DoN General Counsel agreed and in a letter dated 7 Apr 2006 the Under Secretary of the Navy acknowledged DirInt as a Senior Officer Intelligence Community (SOIC) and directed SecNavInsts be adjusted accordingly. When EO 12333 was updated in 2008, the term SOIC was changed to HEIC (Head of an Element of the Intel Community), but the authorities remained the same. The designation is important for SCI security-related duties of the DirInt, among others.

Several DoD Directives and SecNavInsts were issued since Intel Dept was formed, with perhaps a bit more volume following the 2004 Intelligence Reform and terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and the 2008 updating of EO 12333. In each case, having a dedicated HQMC Intelligence Department staff allowed it to focus on the important policies and to deal better with our Service, OSD, and IC counterparts. One small example was SecNavInst 3850.2C of 20 Jul 2005, "Department of the Navy Counterintelligence." An earlier version of this series indicated N2 set DoN CI policy, NCIS executed it, and USMC had only tactical CI capability. This new SecNavInst actually outlined in specifics the DirInt and the broader USMC role in CI.

MEU (SOC) Success Stories

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)) success stories are too numerous to relate in a short essay, but it is important to note that before OIF/OEF, it was usually the post-MEU(SOC) command colonels and GOs that were the best customers and supporters of Marine Intel. Most peacetime Regt and MAG commanders did not have the regular exposure to all-source Intel capabilities that a MEU(SOC) commander had. In general, all of our successes in growing USMC Intel resources have been based on the great success of forward deployed Intel Marines.

One particular pre-9/11 MEU(SOC) deployment is worth noting. In 1999, the 26th MEU(SOC) had a

deployment right out of a Hollywood script. On 30 Apr 1999, they went ashore in Albania to provide security for a 20,000-person refugee camp for displaced Kosovar Albanians. Then in June they back-loaded and sailed around Greece to come ashore in the northern Greek town of Lithoro on 10 Jun 1999 bound for Macedonia as Kosovo peacekeepers. While located in-port at Spain after back-loading from Kosovo, the 26th MEU sailed to the vicinity of Istanbul, Turkey, in response to the aftermath of an earthquake. Participation in Operation AVID RESPONSE included the rescue of survivors, providing medical care, and distribution of relief supplies. Needless to say the Intel Marines of 26th MEU came back with a great briefing on jumping from one type of crisis mission to another every 60 days and providing the wide variety of Intel support required with the same small team.

The "free play" nature of Intel support in Special Operations Capable exercises (SOCEX) -- the MEU(SOC) missions practiced during workups -- made commanders and operations officers at all echelons of the MEU much better customers of Intel, even if the MEU(SOC) was never committed during a deployment.

Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom

Certainly, the best marketing Marine Intel has ever received has been the tremendous Intel successes of OIF and OEF. Good histories exist, so only a brief outline will be provided.

On 25 Nov 2001, the 15th MEU(SOC) arrived in Afghanistan and began to set up a fortified base at "Camp Rhino" south of Kandahar. By 13 Dec 2001, elements of the 15th and 26th MEU(SOC)s arrived in the city of Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, and secured the city's airport. The MEUs had united to form TF 58 and were the first general purpose (non-SOF) units on the ground. The TF 58 Intel Center at Kandahar quickly became the central node for intel activity in southern Afghanistan, supporting SOF units from multiple services and countries.

In April 2002, the DirInt requested permission from PP&O and MarCent to hold an Intel planning

conference at Camp Pendleton regarding potential conflict with Iraq. Although it was extremely sensitive at the time, permission was granted and there was great support from all MEFs for what would be the first ever combat deployment by a MEF directly supported by both an IntelBn and a RadBn.

On 21 November 2002, the command element of I MEF deployed to Camp Commando, Kuwait for an exercise and -- for the most part -- stayed through to the 20-21 March 2003 OIF-I D-Day when Marines from I MEF crossed the Kuwaiti border into southern Iraq. I MEF was able to depart theater by the Fall of 2003, but in February 2004 began redeploying for OIF-II to relieve the Army's 82nd Airborne Division in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, on 20 March 2004.

Due to the shift from traditional force-on-force to counterinsurgency operations, as well as changes in personalities in key Intel leadership positions, the OIF-II deployments by IntelBns and RadBns were much more successful from an Intel perspective than OIF-I. Many innovations occurred in OIF-II (2004-2008). Examples include the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC) supporting the GCE, SigInt Operational Control Elements (OCE) and CI/HUMINT Tactical Control Elements (TCE) at Marine infantry regiments, Company-Level Intel Cells (CLIC) at company Forward Operating Bases, and MCIA cultural intelligence support. As a number of DirInts have said, all of the great work by the intel Marines forward made Intel Dept's job inside the beltway very easy.

MCISR-E Delegates Authority to Our Leaders

As the OccFld grew in size and MCISR-E matured, it required less centralization than prior to the 1994 Intel Plan. Delegating considerable authority to leaders across the extended enterprise was unfamiliar but necessary to make the MCISR-E work as originally envisioned. Of course, this depended on a common understanding of MCISR-E and the certain unifying mechanisms to foster teamwork. Borrowing from the Marine Air Board (MAB) model, MCCDC established a Command Element Advocacy Board (CEAB) that allowed the DirInt to establish an ISR Operational Advisory Group (OAG). The ISR OAG allowed the DirInt to hold bi-annual meetings of all Intel Colonels to discuss wide-ranging policy and programming issues.

Many key command, leadership, and policy opportunities were made available to intel Marines over the years. We went from three LtCol command opportunities in 1994 (MCSB and two RadBns) to eight (MCSB, three RadBns, three IntelBns, and an I&I for ISB) plus intel LtCols were made eligible for command of ReconBns and several served in this capacity during OIF. DirInt was also able to designate MCIA as a colonel command and supported TECOM grouping Intel training detachments around CONUS into a colonel command called Marine Corps Intelligence Schools (MCIS). Intel colonels were made eligible to command MHGs and MarDiv HQ Bns and three of our colonels did so in Iraq. PM Intel was created as a colonel's billet at SysCom and within MCCDC a colonel billet was created called Intel Integration Division (IID).


It remains to historians to determine the overall effectiveness of the 1994 Intel Plan, but there is little doubt that its implementation brought about significant change within the Intelligence OccFld in the years following its publication.

¹ Maj C.E. Colvard, "Unfortunately, We Fought Like We Trained," *MCG* Vol. 75, Issue 9 (Sep 1991), 20-22.



A former Marine Corps Assistant Director of Intelligence, Mr. Decker subsequently served as the 5th Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight. He is an adjunct associate professor at the Center of Security Studies in Georgetown University.





Marine Corps Intelligence Education Foundation (MCIEF) Bequest Program

Have you sometimes wondered how you can provide enduring support to deserving intelligence Marines and their families?

There's a simple way. Make a bequest in your will to the MCIEF Scholarship Fund.

College costs continue to increase and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Those of us who are eligible for the Post 9/11 GI Bill and have managed to transfer education benefits are fortunate, however there are many members and potential members of the Association who aren't so fortunate.

If you aren't aware, MCIA/MCIEF annually awards a \$2000 scholarship to the son or daughter of a member. Currently there's no endowment in the Fund, which means we are funding the scholarship from operating funds, that is, your dues and corporate sponsorships. The scholarship is a core function of the Association. We will continue to award it but this is a less than optimal way to operate.

With an endowment of only \$40,000 we would be able to fund the scholarship with no impact to our operating funds. Why stop there? \$2,000 is not a lot these days. With multiples of that we can award larger amounts, four-year scholarships or multiple recipients.

If you are considering this, please contact Steve Eklund at eklundstephen@yahoo.com or at (214) 223-3792. He will provide you with the proper language and additional instructions.



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The below statement by Mr. Michael H. Decker to Congress well summarizes where Marine Corps intelligence found itself ten years after the 1994 Intelligence Plan and more than two years after combat operations began. It is appropriate to republish this unclassified historical document to best gauge the progress of the MCISRE since that time and well complements Mr. Decker's preceding article -- EMW

MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS AND LESSONS LEARNED IN RECENT OPERATIONS:

**Statement by Director of Intelligence to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 April 2004**

Prepared by Colonel Kate Prokop, USMC

Statement For The Record

Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee for requesting Marine Corps participation in this hearing on our intelligence programs and lessons learned from recent military operations. It is an honor to be here to discuss Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) programs funded by Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) funding and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).

During this past year, the Marine Corps, both active and reserve, engaged in operations around the globe. Our successes in executing Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) depended on our Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) having a reach-back capability to leverage and populate theater, service and national intelligence repositories, while maintaining a tactically self-sufficient ISR network to support forward MAGTF fire and maneuver. We fund our ISR systems, generally referred to as the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS), in TIARA [Tactical Intelligence And Related Activities – EMW] because although networked and joint enabling, they are integral to our tactical combat command elements and maneuver units.

Marine Corps ISR exists to support EMW [Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare – EMW] and, specifically, the commander's planning, decision-making, and execution. Our previous Marine ISR modernization efforts emphasized increased collection and analytical capability at the maneuver level of command and reach-back support from theater, service and national organizations. We have sought, and we continue to seek, to transform how we fight by providing unprecedented ISR capability and access to all of our combat echelons--from our small units such as companies all the way to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), our largest MAGTF. These efforts led to a number of successes during OIF-I that I would like to share with you.

Marine commanders task organized their organic intelligence support to adapt to the speed and distance of their specific operations. We augmented our Marine Divisions with support from Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) squadrons, topographic/imagery intelligence (IMINT) specialists and TROJAN SPIRIT-LITE intelligence communications systems to provide responsive ISR support and secure mobile connectivity. Likewise, we augmented the next lower maneuver echelon, the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), with a wide array of ISR enhancements such as Dragon Eye UAVs, Counterintelligence Human Intelligence Exploitation Teams (CI/HETs), and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Support Teams (SSTs) to improve their organic collection capability; TROJAN SPIRIT IIs to provide secure mobile connectivity; and data link receivers for aerial sensors such as the Pioneer UAV, the Navy's P3 and the Litening POD on the AV8-B Harrier to provide them with a "bird's eye" view of the battlefield. These enhancements provided the capability to conduct immediate and responsive ISR operations such as employing the Dragon Eye UAV to safely scout the first crossing of the Tigris River;

and capitalizing on CI/HET assets embedded with Light Armored Reconnaissance units to facilitate a prisoner of war rescue north of Baghdad.

The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Marine Corps' service intelligence center, provided Federated Production support before D-Day, including lines of communication (LOCs) and inundation studies. This intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) support was critical to 1st Marine Division receiving approval to bypass Al Kut and strike toward Baghdad on secondary routes. MCIA serves as the parent command for Intelligence Marines on joint duty and in combat support agencies. Consequently, MCIA connects Marines assigned to Defense Agencies, Regional Security Operations Centers (RSOCs), Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), and Joint Reserve Intelligence Centers (JRICs) and enables them to work as a virtual team in support of warfighting and combat development intelligence requirements.

The MEF's organic Intelligence Battalion coordinated reach-back targeting support by leveraging the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA) St. Louis, and the Joint Intelligence Center Central Command (JICCENT)/Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) in order to populate automated target folders for strikes conducted in theater. These target folders enabled advancing Marine Forces to rapidly strike and destroy artillery units of an Iraqi Division between Al Kut and Baghdad, thereby denying the enemy the ability to use these assets to hinder our advance.

As these stories illustrate, TIARA funded MAGTF ISR assets are embedded in command elements and maneuver units. We have technical specialists in all-source fusion, SIGINT, CI/HUMINT, reconnaissance and UAV operations that can be task organized to support any given commander's situation based upon his specific requirements. Enhanced intelligence support to the Marine maneuver unit in combat enables more efficient utilization of theater, service and national collection assets while simultaneously enabling commanders to focus their organic collection assets on their immediate areas of responsibility. We believe these organic capabilities should remain in TIARA so the commander will have an ownership stake in not only making them part of his team in combat, but in preserving and enhancing these capabilities during Service planning, programming, and budgeting.

Our EMW concept continues to be used with great success today in Iraq and Afghanistan for force protection, security and stability operations, and counter-terrorist operations. Our commanders are using actionable intelligence to conduct focused raids and attacks on a daily basis in Iraq and Afghanistan. When only partial information exists, commanders are conducting patrols and "cordon and knock" operations to generate intelligence. Actionable intelligence requires not only commanders who are empowered and willing to act, but also the presentation of target development information by Marines who are viewed as part of the team. Both focused raids and patrols are examples of commanders viewing their ISR Marines as trusted members of the command element's decision making process. It is very rewarding to routinely read in commanders' Situation Reports things like "...forces throughout the AO positioned to conduct focused, intelligence driven operations against the enemy...;" "...execution time based on actionable intelligence...;" and "...continue to gather and refine targetable intelligence...".

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for your support of Marine Corps intelligence. I have tremendous pride in the contributions made and the hard work being done by our ISR Marines. With your continued support, intelligence will remain the indispensable precursor to and enabler of MAGTF operations. The Marine Corps remains focused on organizing, training, and equipping our forces to best support Marine commanders, combatant commanders and national decision makers throughout the spectrum of conflict. Incorporating recent experiences, increasing our forces' integration with joint capabilities, exploiting the flexibility and rapid response capabilities of our units, and preserving the adaptability of our Marines will collectively lead to more options for the Combatant Commanders. I look forward to addressing our successes in detail in closed session.



Synergy, Efficiency, and Accountability: Command Versus Staff Functions in Military Intelligence Operations

James Howcroft, Colonel, USMC (Ret.)

During my 30 years as an intelligence officer in the US Marine Corps, I've had the opportunity to serve at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. As a collector, an analyst, a producer and an intelligence consumer, I've seen large well-resourced intelligence units fail and I've seen small units with few resources succeed. The difference is **leadership and focus at the J2/G2 level.**

Leadership.

An intelligence leader has to be knowledgeable about the capabilities he can task. He must be able to direct and resource properly and he must be willing to take on the **task and responsibility of setting standards and holding people accountable to those standards.** Intelligence leaders must clearly define the roles and responsibilities of their subordinates and, most importantly, themselves. Being a good intelligence leader doesn't mean you are the smartest or most knowledgeable guy in the room, it means you know your people and how best to employ their skills and capabilities. The best way to gain this understanding is to occasionally mix it up with the analysts to teach and lead by example. This also affords you the opportunity to learn from your subordinates.

A G2 must fight the widespread tendency of intel leadership to micromanage their subordinates. Their promotions are likely the result of their success while working in the billets their subordinates now hold. They are comfortable with these jobs and may find it easier to do the old job than to focus on the challenges of their leadership position. I was most successful in my career when I admitted to myself that I **wasn't** the smartest guy in the room and that the people working for me were smarter or better at

their jobs than I was—something that’s hard to do as a colonel. My job as a leader was to set standards and create an environment that allowed them to maximize their skills. I gave them freedom and responsibility and the protection of my rank, as well as the credit they deserved when they succeeded. Their success represented a win for me.

Focus

For an intel Marine at any level (J2/G2/S2) to be effective, he must be joined at the hip with the decision makers, operators, and planners he supports. He must also be intimately involved in the decision making process. The G2 must know the commander’s preferred analytical device, whether it be a slide or a written memo, and he must try to anticipate the commander’s needs and requirements. It is too late if the commander has to ask. There is a certain point in the decision cycle where intel is useful and a good G2 knows this. Since staffs take time to function, a good G2 can provide relevant products with enough lead time to be useful. Intel officers need the time to task, collect and create a product in a useful format and deliver it to the consumer. Events move on and you can become irrelevant.

It is vitally important to manage expectations and educate the commander and rest of staff about **what intel can and cannot do and how long it takes to produce**. In my opinion, this is a frequent failing of intel Marines who are striving to be “can do” guys and “team players.” Sometimes we have to be unpopular; the guy who has to deliver uncomfortable or unwelcome news. Intel specialists must be able to say when you don’t know something. Unfortunately, we often hurt ourselves by trying to make our business seem special because we work with classified material and are frequently physically segregated. This makes us hard to understand and employ effectively. We need to break down these barriers, **admit we aren’t special**, and work hard to keep close, communicate and get deep into the decision-making cycle.

Intelligence is certainly a difficult job, but how it gets done isn’t particularly unique. Intelligence is just one of many resources that a commander allocates or tasks to accomplish his mission. An intel Marine’s job is to help a commander decide how best to employ his assets to accomplish his mission in a way that minimizes risk. Risk is always there. A commander must know where and how much risk he is taking. The G2 is the officer who helps him figure this out. The G2 tells the commander what he should do, the G4 and G6 tell him what he can do, and the commander tells the G3 what to do.

“The G2 tells the commander what he should do, the G4 and G6 tell him what he can do, and the commander tells the G3 what to do.”

Let’s review again the staff process and the role of the G2 as a primary staff officer. Higher headquarters provides guidance and direction to the unit commander. The commander directs his staff to work together in writing a concept of operations (the CONOPs or OPlan) with tasks for subordinate units. The commander, through the G3, then orders subordinate units to do the tasks needed to achieve the overall mission. The G2, as the commander’s principal intel advisor, formulates and coordinates this intelligence tasking with subordinate units. He is the best person suited to do this. Since he is joined at the hip with the commander, he knows what the boss needs now, and what he will need in the future. Based on his experience, the G2 knows the capabilities of intel units, their people and their systems.

It is not the G2’s job to worry about specific tasking or operational planning. This is no different from the way Fire Support Coordinators (FSCs) delegate. The commander tells the FSC what his desired effect on target is. The FSC comes up with a concept for how to accomplish this and he relays that concept and desired effect to artillery and air units. He doesn’t tell them where to put the howitzers, what type of ammo to use, or the number of salvos to fire.

Once the G2 has crafted this tasking, identified the type of product the boss needs and the time it is needed at the HQ, he must then step back and let subordinate units do their job. **Always fight micromanagement.** Subordinates almost always know how to do their job better than their boss.

As General George Patton said: **“Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity”**

A key to a G2's success is to clearly separate the intelligence staff function from the intelligence command function. **Command and control are two distinct processes.** We often mix these two words together and think they are the same thing. They can be, but they don't have to be. There is a mistaken belief that in order for a unit to be responsive, you must own it, run it, and command it. I understand this attitude. I had it myself. There is a tendency for staff officer to want ownership of the units working for them. It is 'sexier,' more prestigious and better for promotion if you are a commander rather than a "mere staff officer."

Confusing staff and command responsibilities impedes the ability of the staff officer G2 to stay focused on **the decision-making process.** He crafts the requirements and tasks to fit into the process and procedures he has developed and **coordinated with** the subordinate intel commanders. He conveys the finished intel to the boss, giving credit to those who made it. A G2 focused on owning and running a subordinate unit is distracted from his **key task of interaction with commander and operators.** The **G2 doesn't have the time** to be consumed by the administrative, logistics, and training needs of the subordinate intel units. With the proper procedures, authorities and communication, the G2 can **control** an intel unit's actions and activities without having the responsibility and distractions of commanding it.

Putting the intelligence collection and production capability under an intelligence commander who is separate from the intelligence staff has a number of positive effects. No service has enough resources for every staff to have their own personal intel unit. Separating intelligence collection and analysis assets from the staff means they can be responsive to other units in need rather than just to a single staff. The intelligence unit commander has the responsibility and authority to employ his people and capabilities to meet the requirements of a variety of units in need, as prioritized in coordination with the G2. The intelligence unit commander can shift, pool, and surge his assets to meet his most pressing requirements.

It's also vital to ensure that analysts and collectors are tightly connected within a single unit. This allows them to organically fuse and cross-queue the various collection disciplines.. This fusion and cross-queueing needs to happen at the analyst/collector level to be effective, not at the top of the intel chain. If not, crucial information becomes stovepiped, unity of effort suffers and the senior commander doesn't get a thorough analytical product. Putting intelligence producers and analysts in a single command rather than spreading them throughout various intel staffs allows them to train and mentor younger guys and learn from their experience first-hand.

It is important that both the G2 and the intel unit commanders develop coordinated standards and expectations for the intel production. The process must be transparent. Everyone should be able to see where requests and products are in the process. Everyone should have a common understanding of what products and procedures will look like and how long they will take to complete. Rules and responsibilities must be clearly defined. The commander must then train his people to the standards he developed in coordination with the J2/G2. The commander is held accountable for meeting these standards. This cannot be personality dependent. Good working relationships help, but bad ones should not impede this process. This is bigger than personalities and egos. Intelligence is about managing uncertainty. Lives are at risk.

For this intelligence staff/command synergy to work there are several requirements:

- Clear delineation of roles and responsibilities
- Accountability to fulfill those roles and responsibilities
- A sense of partnership and trust
- Good communication through formal and informal channels
- Input on personnel evaluations, some form of leverage (if needed) to forge cooperation.
- An arbitrator, someone above both the G2 and intel commander to resolve disagreements and bang heads together

In conclusion, we must always **remember the need for a clear focus by all concerned**. The commander **focuses down** on his people, their needs and the tools and skill required to do their job. The staff officer **focuses up** on the commander and what the rest of the staff needs.

Think about intelligence as the product of a shoe factory. The G2 is the equivalent of the salesmen. He interacts with the customers, he learns what they want and will want, what will sell on the street. He is in the shop every day and he knows what people are looking for. The G2 then tells the factory manager, via a predetermined order process, what style of product to make, how many and when he needs them. The factory manager is like the intel unit commander. He takes care of running the factory and makes sure the employees have the resources they need to be productive. Once the product is completed it is delivered to the shoe store to meet the needs of the consumer. The factory doesn't have the context of what the consumer wants. The shoe salesman doesn't have the skills or the time to do the daily production.

Neither the shoe salesman nor the shoemaker would be successful on his/her own. They need each other to prosper and meet the customers' needs. Neither is more prestigious or more important than the other. Both understand their roles and responsibilities and take pride in their work. So, the next time you are working on a particular intel issue... figure out if you are the salesman or the shoemaker.





Jim Howcroft served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, First Marine Division, during the preparations for and execution of the invasion of Iraq. He subsequently led I MEF G2 in the redeployment and conduct of counter-insurgency/stabilization operations. He is frequent author both for the *INTSUM* and *Small Wars Journal*.





USMC INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

- Planning & Direction
- Collection
- Processing & Exploitation
- Production
- Dissemination
- UTILIZATION



What's Next?

The Six Functions of Marine Intelligence: Perspectives and Recommendations

By LtCol Michael D. Reilly, USMC

A rather interesting question was recently posed regarding the utility and current applicability of the six doctrinal functions of Marine intelligence. This is an interesting question on many levels as it is doubtful that most Marine intelligence professionals reading this article could rattle off these six doctrinal functions found in MCWP 2-1 Intelligence Operations (1-6) without a great deal of assistance. For the few readers who knew that the six functions of Marine intelligence are to support: (1) the commander's estimate, (2) situation development, (3) indications and warning, (4) support to force protection, (5) support to targeting, and (6) support to combat assessment, congratulations! Everyone else has somehow provided intelligence support to their respective commanders in one way or another without ever knowing how their actions related to these six functions. That, in and of itself, is a commentary as to the utility and relevance of these functions in their current form. With this general lack of relevance as context, this article poses two fundamental questions:

- What is the purpose of the current six functions of Marine intelligence?
- Are the current functions of Marine intelligence accurate and, if not, what should they be?

Let's tackle the first question by comparing the six functions of Marine intelligence with the six functions of Marine aviation found in MCWP 3-2 and the six functions of Marine logistics found in MCWP 4-11. The comparison with aviation and logistics is interesting partly due their well-defined functions, but also because logistics is a warfighting function while aviation is not. A quick review of these doctrinal publications reveals that, while all the documents use the term "function," these terms are used in very different manners. For example, the six functions of intelligence are listed as basic support functions to other missions or tasks (i.e. "Support to Force Protection"). In essence, the intelligence functions show "relevance" in how intelligence supports a commander at various points along the planning, decision, execution, and assessment (PDE&A) cycle. Conversely, the six aviation functions are actual missions or tasks (i.e. Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Control of Aircraft and Missiles, Electronic Warfare, Offensive Air Support, and Antiair Warfare) and the six logistics functions are centered on "task-specific" functions (i.e. Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, General Engineering, Health Services, Other Services).

It appears that there is no consistent definition of a doctrinal "function." However, a simple review of the organizational structures of a

Marine Logistics Group or a Marine Air Wing shows that these occupational fields organize, train, and equip their operational units per their functions. The same cannot be said for Marine intelligence that has no “support to” company while there are maintenance battalions in the Marine Logistics Group and air defense units in the Marine Air Wing. For example, how does the MEF G-2 organize, train, and equip to develop the situation or to support the commander’s estimate? There is no clear-cut answer, but every G-2 does this as a part of their roles and responsibilities. Frankly, the current functions of Marine intelligence mean very little to the average G-2 ... or Intelligence Battalion Commander for that matter. They do not drive organizational constructs. They do not holistically drive training pipelines, although there is training associated with each function. They do not drive programmatic acquisitions.

The astute reader might notice that the aviation and logistics functions never say “support to” even though they obviously provide support to the MAGTF commander. So why do the majority of the intelligence functions start with “support to”? In researching this very question, it was noted that the doctrinal functions of Marine intelligence were designed to provide an explanation for the tension that inherently exists with the prioritization of the intelligence effort at various times throughout the PDE&A cycle. In essence, the current functions were designed to highlight the friction and trade-offs between the various support efforts provided to the commander at various times. For example, if the G-2 placed emphasis on supporting the commander’s estimate then there may be less capacity for supporting situation development. While this line of thinking may have been appropriate (even wise) when this doctrine was initially written, this paper proposes that the capacity of Marine intelligence has improved to the point where these trade-offs are not so dramatic or required.

Additionally, after a decade of supporting conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders have come to expect that their intelligence apparatus can accomplish all of its functions in support of the operation at hand. I propose that we, as Marine Corps Intelligence, have not

established applicable and useful functions for the current and future operating environments across the full range of military operations (ROMO). Therefore, the current functions mean very little to the average AC/S G-2 in the operating forces and do not support the organizing, equipping, and training of intelligence organizations in a holistic and consistent manner. In the simplest of terms a doctrinal function should detail the distinct activities that the occupational field actually “does” in support of the commander. These “do”-type functions should then be the foundation of our organizational constructs, our acquisitions, and our training.

Before we continue perhaps it would be helpful to break this problem down to a more base-line level. A commander engaging in any operation is concerned with only four basic categories of information. These four categories are information on the friendly forces, the effects of weather and terrain, and the threat to his forces. The intelligence warfighting function concerns itself with three of the four categories on the commander’s mind while the other five warfighting functions are primarily designed to support the commander’s understanding of his own forces and how to apply those forces to accomplish the mission. So an argument could be made that the functions of Marine intelligence are to define and describe the effects of the weather, terrain, and threat with relation to the assigned mission. While this may be overly broad, it does capture “what we do” as intelligence professionals. However, if adopted as functions these may be too broad and would do little to support the organizing, equipping, and training of forces.

So if it’s agreed that Marine intelligence needs more applicable functions that we can organize our forces around then these functions should be more in line with the activities or actions that intelligence sections and commands actually do. But there’s another problem. Marine intelligence already outlines its general actions within the six steps of the intelligence cycle – direction, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and utilization. There is no parallel all-encompassing cycle for aviation or logistics. The closest parallel is the targeting cycle within the fires warfighting function, which is heavily supported by intelligence. So, the real question may actually be that if we

need intelligence functions, do they need to be clearly distinct from the six steps of the intelligence cycle? This is a valid question and one that deserves discussion because a strong argument can be made that the intelligence cycle does the best job in actually describing the functions of intelligence. For all intents and purposes the intelligence cycle is what we “do” to support the commander at all levels of command. But is the intelligence cycle too broad? Are the individual steps in the intelligence cycle too general to serve as intelligence functions?

For the purpose of initiating debate, this article asserts that Marine intelligence needs defined functions and that those functions do not necessarily have to be clearly distinct from the intelligence cycle. Furthermore, intelligence functions should accomplish three key tasks. They should assist in driving the organization, training, and equipping of intelligence forces, be flexible enough to adapt to future operating environments, and ensure that they accurately represent how intelligence supports the commander as a warfighting function.

Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), formerly known as IPB – the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. IPOE is the primary tool employed to support the development of the commander’s estimate, support operational planning, and disseminating knowledge. If done correctly, the four steps in the IPOE process provide accurate intelligence on the effects of weather, terrain, indigenous populations, and the threat, as well as suggesting the means and methods that the MAGTF might use to gain leverage over those elements. IPOE is not limited to conventional or counterinsurgency operations. Rather, it can and should be used effectively across the full range of military operations (ROMO), from the Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operation (HA/DR), to the three-block war, to major conventional combat. In addition to IPOE, one of the key areas of support that an intelligence section provides to the commander is integrating and providing accurate intelligence to the targeting cycle. In order to do this, the G-2 usually organizes a Target Intelligence Section (augmented by personnel from the Intelligence and Radio Battalions) and

“Real, useful functions should support the battle rhythms of current operations and future operations throughout the entire PDE&A cycle...intelligence functions should articulate the distinctive activities carried out by intelligence sections at all levels of command.”

Additionally they should nest well with the intelligence cycle, collections cycle, targeting cycle, and operational planning processes. Real, useful functions should support the battle rhythms of current operations and future operations throughout the entire PDE&A cycle. Also, as stated previously, intelligence functions should articulate the distinctive activities carried out by intelligence sections at all levels of command.

Therefore, in order to begin the discussion and with the full understanding that additional refinement is required, this article proposes the following four revised functions of Marine intelligence: analytical production, operations, plans/policy, and intelligence systems.

Analytical Production. The most basic function of an intelligence section is to provide the commander with products that are analyzed and synthesized with all of the intelligence relevant to the requirement. It all begins with the Intelligence

conducts target systems analysis, identifies key nodes, high pay-off targets, high-value targets and assists the commander in identifying the best way to engage these targets with kinetic and/or non-kinetic fires. And since modern military operations are conducted in an information environment, the G-2 needs to have personnel who are well-versed in Information Operations (IO) to support the G-3 and the commander’s IO plan. These are just a few examples of activities that would fall under the umbrella of analytical production as a function of Marine intelligence.

Operations. Intelligence operations encompass more than just collection operations. Intelligence operations include all of the activities conducted by an intelligence section to support current and future operations. Of course collection requirements and operations management falls under this function. These collection operations are usually integrated with on-going Theater ground and airborne collection as well as National

overhead systems collection. At the tactical (or MAGTF level) collection operations are conducted by the full host of organic MAGTF collection assets including: HUMINT Exploitation Teams, SIGINT Support Teams, Scout Snipers, Ground Reconnaissance, Unmanned Aerial Systems, Unattended Ground Sensors, Light Armored Reconnaissance, Fixed-wing and Rotary-wing aviation reconnaissance. Each of the above collection assets represent a number of organizations, programs of record and training pipelines that would be better advocated for if this was a doctrinal function of Marine intelligence.

This should be a simple argument to make, as collection operations are clearly an activity that the G-2 “does” in support of the MAGTF commander. Additionally, the Collection Management Working Group (CMWG) is typically the only battle rhythm event that is hosted and run by the G-2 as the office of primary responsibility (OPR). In addition to collection operations, Marine intelligence also supports the commander with counterintelligence (CI). CI supports a number of customers, not only the Force Protection Officer and the Rear Area Commander. CI cuts across the warfighting functions by supporting Force Protection, Information Assurance, Information Security, OPSEC, Computer Network Operations (CNO), and Information Operations. Additionally, CI activities provide a specific and unique capability for the commander that is not replicated in any other warfighting function. In addition to collection and CI operations, this function includes also the current operations support to operations. In its essence this includes maintaining situational awareness. Situational awareness includes the whole host of activities required to provide intelligence support to steady-state operations, support while in garrison, and the little-known skill of battle-tracking / Red-COP – or Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) as it is currently being referred – management which should be the “bread and butter” of the G-2 during current operations regardless if these operations are in support of conventional, counterinsurgency, or hybrid-threat operations. These activities require clear organization, specific training, and dedicated equipment in order to conduct them properly.

Plans/Policy. All intelligence sections support the commander’s plans and policies. At the MEF and MSC levels this is accomplished by specified intelligence plans sections that have personnel designated to support the commander’s operational planning teams (OPT) and working groups. While the intelligence Plans section relies heavily upon analytical production and collections personnel to support the OPT their specific purpose, training, and focus on planning makes this activity distinctive as a separate function of intelligence.

Intelligence Systems. In order to support the analytical, operational, and planning functions of intelligence units and sections, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSSCOM) intelligence program management office, in conjunction with the HQMC Intelligence Department’s Radio Battalion Modernization Programs, develops and procures numerous programs of record (POR) and non-POR systems. Additionally, numerous Marines within the Marine intelligence community learn the fine arts of designing intelligence networks and providing vital connectivity in support of their commanders and senior intelligence officers. For too long there has been little to no formal recognition that these efforts are key to Marine intelligence and vital to our success as intelligence professionals. Currently there is no formal training (aside from the 2651 MOS) for officers and enlisted Marines to learn the intricacies and technical knowledge necessary to optimally run intelligence networks and systems.

Therefore, in order to ensure that current and future programs of record can be directly linked to an intelligence function and to raise the priority of organizing and equipping intelligence systems sections to actually accomplish the tasks they are assigned, it is vital that intelligence systems become a function of Marine Intelligence. Each of the proposed functions articulates a broad activity that Marine intelligence actually does that can be categorized and tied back to mission essential tasks and training and readiness standards. As previously discussed, all four functions are carried out during the PDE&A cycle at all levels throughout the force. But unlike the current doctrinal functions, these provide clear lanes for HQMC to systematically and logically

plan and implement policies and programs for the organizing, training, and equipping of an intelligence unit; whether a G-2 section or a Radio Battalion. Additionally, these proposed functions are broad enough to be used across the full range of military options (ROMO) and can be applied within each element of the MAGTF.

If adopted, these functions of intelligence could assist G-2s in better articulating what it is that the intelligence section brings to the fight in support of the commander in realistic and tangible ways as these functions provide an outline for the G-2's concept of intelligence. Additionally, by more clearly articulating the actual functions of an intelligence section or command in the operating forces (or the supporting establishment) the senior leaders at HQMC Intelligence Department should be able to more effectively defend intelligence interests against ever-tightening resources by linking current and future intelligence organizations, training pipelines, and programs of record to intelligence functions that are better defined and relevant to the Operational Force Commanders.



Lieutenant Colonel Reilly is the Commanding Officer of 3rd Intelligence Battalion, III Marine Expeditionary Force, in Okinawa, Japan. His previous assignments were with II MEF G2 and as Deputy Director of Intelligence, Regional Command SouthWest, in Afghanistan. He is a frequent contributor to the *INTSUM* and to the *Marine Corps Gazette*.



Marine Corps Structured Models, Approaches, and Techniques (SMATs) Featured in New Book

Roger George and James Bruce have extensively revised their original work, *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (2008) in this new volume, *Analyzing Intelligence: National Security Practitioners' Perspectives*. Within Part V "Analysis for Twenty-First-Century Issues" is Chapter 15, written by Vincent Stewart, Drew Cukor, Joseph Larson III, and Matthew Pottinger, entitled "New Analytic Techniques for Tactical Military Intelligence."

"Training analysts in the basic skills of analysis and teaching them to read, write, research, and engage in structured thought at the highest levels are necessary but not sufficient conditions for producing reliable intelligence. Instead, a standard for reliability must be found in the repeated and robust use of applied tradecraft: field-derived, experiential learning that has been codified, validated, refined, and taught to tactical intelligence analysts, whose products and professionalism will be a principal determinant of US military success on the battlefield in the twenty-first century."

-- from the chapter, pages 262-262.

INTELLIGENCE CASE METHOD LIBRARY

We at MCIA, Inc., are pleased to continue our first member-submitted case in support of the Intelligence Case Method Library. Decision-forcing cases such as this one put Marines in the shoes of a historical counterpart, facing a real-world problem. Long favored as an educational technique in war colleges and graduate schools, decision-forcing cases demand critical thinking skills and concise communications from case method participants. We hope that these will be useful in unit intelligence Professional Military Education.

In Part A of this case, a Russian Federal Security Bureau, FSB, desk analyst was convinced that Chechen terrorism was increasing and that a school was a likely target. After all, the separatist extremists had developed a taste for spectacular attacks involving mass casualties, as manifested by the Moscow Nord-Ost Theater attack. When and where would they attack a Russian school in North Ossetia? And perhaps most important in conducting anti-terrorism protective measures, how would they do it?



Day One

The Chechen Flea (B)

On August 29th many of the Ingush families living in the town of Beslan left their domiciles with their belongings and returned to Ingushetia. None of the members of the Russian government seemed to notice, although it was enough for local town officials to post a guard at the Beslan school early in the morning of September 1st.

On the “Day of Knowledge” (a day celebrating Russian children’s first day of school where students bring gifts to their teachers) at 0845 on September 1st, 2004, gunshots were heard in the agricultural and industrial community of 40,000 in Beslan. Immediate and extended families accompanied their first through eleventh graders to Beslan School Number 1. Around 40 Chechen, Ingush, and Arab terrorists--ranging in age from 17 to their mid- twenties--corralled over 1,200 children, teachers, and family members into the school’s gymnasium, theater, and cafeteria within the first fifteen minutes of the attack.




Figure 1: Gymnasium Initial Hostage Schematic

Glimpses of men shot in the temple with blood oozing from their mouths heightened the sense of panic. Trembling with dread, most of the hostages sat on the gymnasium floor as over 100 pre-fabricated improvised explosive devices were wired together and placed in an interwoven pattern around the hostages (Figure 1). The terrorists forced men and strong boys among the hostages to barricade all the entrances. Afterwards, these barriers were wired with explosives to dissuade and complicate a Russian Special Forces assault similar to the Nord-Ost Theater. After the able-bodied male hostages completed their tasks, they were executed to intimidate those victims left alive to deny the desire to unite and overcome the terrorists *en masse*. The windows in the gymnasium were broken to rapidly dissipate any tear gas employed immediately prior to a Russian assault. Meanwhile, the terrorists continued to beat, rape, and kill hostages, while shooting and screaming threats. The girls were raped in the most brutal ways imaginable. Some were raped right on the floor of the gym in front of all of the hostages and small children. The terrorists further demoralized the children by forcing them to relieve themselves where they sat, many urinating into plastic bottles to later consume due to dehydration in the sweltering heat. By 10:30, local police attempted to establish a cordon and waited for government troops to take over the command negotiation site.

As the morning progressed, the temperatures in the gymnasium began to soar. Some children began to vomit while others started to faint. Denied any type of food, children began to eat the flowers that they had brought as gifts for their teachers. By 12:30, the terrorists released a video filmed inside of the gym to the authorities (Figure 2). The video message demanded the release of 20 Chechens and Ingush prisoners held by the Russian authorities. To defeat past Russian methods of wearing down the besiegers, the terrorists also threatened to execute hostages if the school's electricity was shut



Figure 2: The First Hostage Video Released

down or if the Russian government intercepted any of their communications. Additionally, the terrorists asked former Ingusheti President Ruslan Aushev to serve as a negotiator.

Outside of the school, local citizens became the greatest obstacle for the counterterror teams and the local police forces. As the siege wore on, many would return to the school with weapons in a drunken state, in an attempt to take actions into their own hands since the government did not appear to effectively intervene in a timely manner. Many individuals within the crowd begged the military and police officials not to assault the school for fear of more deaths.

By the end of the first day, over two hundred Alpha Commandos (roughly analogous to Delta Force operators) and Vypmel operatives (similar to Army Special Forces units) began to arrive. Both of these organizations were considered to be experts in counter-terrorism as they resided under the umbrella of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor agency to the KGB. As the teams arrived in waves from across Russia and nearby Chechnya detachments for planning, they discovered there were no blueprints available for the Beslan school, built in 1889. Eventually, a command post was established at the Beslan Culture Center nearby. Throughout the day, overall command appeared to have change hands several times, starting with the local police and militia. Finally, Vladimir Yegorovich Pronichev, the First Deputy of the FSB, arrived on scene and appeared to be in charge for the remainder of the crisis.

His problem was that there were too many Russian government organizations involved--many of them not FSB. There were the MChS emergency services/first responders, the MVD SOBR "special reaction force," the MVD/VV (the Interior Army), MVD OMON "black beret" SWAT Troops, and local police.

Day Two

On day two, the streets became immensely crowded as twenty thousand people gathered around the school and newly established command center. Reporters, locals, and militias intermixed with the disciplined Alpha and Vypmel operatives who had occupied their tactical positions. With initial planning for an assault underway, the operatives began to rotate shifts their over watch positions while conducting rehearsals and resting for the eventual operation to come.

From within the school, the terrorists looked happy. Some would joke with the hostages saying, "I'm a bandit, a terrorist. I came here to kill you." The younger terrorists tended to be cordial and tolerable. On the other hand, Ruslan Tagirovich Khuchbarov, a Chechen terrorist nicknamed "Colonel," was not as sympathetic unless he observed courage in the hostages. One female impressed him as she confronted him, boldly demanding a reason for the horrific conditions. He replied, "How many children do you have here? You can get your children out and any other people that are close to you. In exchange, we'll put a suicide belt on you."

Eventually, the former Ingusheti President Ruslan Aushev was dispatched to serve as the primary negotiator with the terrorist group. Similar to what was done for the Nord-Ost Theater attack, the terrorists had prepared their demands prior to the assault in a neatly folded letter (Figure 3). It ordered the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Chechnya and independence for the Chechen Republic. As part of a good faith gesture, the terrorists allowed those with babies to be released, three women in all.

Vladimir Putin, you were not the one to start the war, but you could be the one to end it, that is if you find the courage and resolve to act like de Gaulle. We are offering you peace on a mutually beneficial basis in line with the principle "independence for security." We can guarantee that if you withdraw the [Russian] troops and recognize Chechen independence, then: we will not strike any political, military or economic deals with anyone against Russia; we will not have any foreign military bases even temporary ones; we will not support or finance groups fighting the Russian Federation; we will join the Commonwealth of Independent States; we will stay in the ruble zone; we could sign the Collective Security Treaty, although we would prefer the status of a neutral state; we can guarantee that all of Russia's Muslims will refrain from armed methods of struggle against the Russian Federation, at least for 10-15 years, on condition that freedom of religion is respected...The Chechen nation is involved in the national liberation struggle for its Freedom and Independence and for its preservation. It is not fighting to humiliate Russia or destroy it. As a free nation, we are interested in a strong neighbor. We are offering peace and the choice is yours.

Figure 3: Message to Russian President

Mothers with other children in the school were not allowed to release them, resulting in a heart-breaking decision to select which children would have to remain inside the house of horror and potentially die.

As day two came to a close, some of the terrorists became edgy and irritable. A clear division between the committed and the non-committed jihadists was evident to the surviving hostages. From the beginning, one faction, the committed jihadists, appeared to know exactly what the plan was. The non-committed did not seem to want to die, nor did they appear to know that the actual target would be a children's elementary school.


The terrorists held the Beslan school and its occupants for nearly 48 hours, released some hostages, and made their demands. Alpha and Vypel operatives were in place, waiting for orders to assault the school. Vladimir Pronichev knew it was up to him to give those orders. But what orders should he give and when should he give them? The only way he could determine was

to be ready for what the terrorists would do and aim to pre-empt, dislocate, or disrupt their murderous activities. But that was the nub of the problem, wasn't it? What would the terrorists do--and how could he know of this in enough time to counteract it?

Submitted by Capt Troy Mitchell




With this book review, the *INTSUM* returns to a more traditional format for these types of articles. Featured works are those that focus on the practice of military intelligence with an intent to encourage professional use in schools, in military societies, PME sessions, and informal discussions. The magazine editorship is constantly searching for tools that best support the professionalization of Marine Corps intelligence; if you have a better idea to promote intelligence literature, please write for us. The MCISRE would benefit from your submissions to the *INTSUM*. --EMW



KILL/CAPTURE

By Eric M. Walters



Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden From 9/11 to Abbottabad. By Peter L. Bergen. New York: Crown Publishers, 2012. ISBN 978-0-307-95557-9 Hardcover: \$26.00 retail.

The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer. New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2012. ISBN 978-0-316-18659-9 Hardcover: \$27.99 retail.

Here is a pair of excellent stories that unintentionally but effectively “book-end” successful investigative paths and outcomes of international manhunts for notorious terrorists. The contrast is not only one of results—Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s capture versus Osama Bin Laden’s death—it’s also in method. As McDermott and Meyer tell it, the search for the shadowy KSM was solved the old-fashioned way: getting a human source close enough so that law enforcement could close in for the arrest. According to Bergen, the Navy SEAL raid against Bin Laden had no benefit of an inside source; it was launched on the basis of a collective hunch from intelligence analysts working in the Washington D.C. area with—as it was said at the time—less confidence in their judgment than for the WMD case against Iraq before the 2003 invasion! Capturing KSM involved a great deal of cooperation from the Pakistanis; they were the ones who arrested him. Going after Bin Laden was a unilateral action with the Pakistanis informed after the fact.

Of course, there are the similarities. Key breaks in both cases occurred due to mistakes the targets—or their associates—made. This once again supports the familiar refrain that criminals can’t afford to make mistakes while their pursuers can succeed in spite of them. With regard for the latter, both books are chock full of harrowing tales of bureaucratic bungling familiar to any government analyst or investigator. According to these authors, it was only through the sheer willpower of a handful of conscientious lower-level professionals that the raw material for success was obtained. There are heroes in the supervisory chain too, people who pushed significant judgments and operations forward, often against heavy pressure and resistance. Both books make for inspiring reading for those who often feel they are the unappreciated underdogs in their intelligence or law enforcement organizations.

McDermott and Meyer's book is written with a focus on the human side of these pursuits. As such, there are even a few surprises for those who are generally familiar with this particular case. The authors reveal that KSM attended a fundamentalist Christian college in North Carolina as a young man, taking advantage of admissions incentives for foreign students. Unfortunately, he and his fellow Muslim classmates were cruelly ostracized on a routine basis. This personally traumatic experience appears to set KSM on the trajectory to terrorism. The culmination of this portrait is the authors' horrific descriptions of KSM personally beheading correspondent Daniel Pearl with a knife while being videotaped. KSM's perseverance, obsessive secrecy, energy, and capacity for violence in promoting and facilitating terrorist plots are impressive. But he meets his match in FBI Special Agent Frank Pellegrino of New York and New York Port Authority Detective Matthew Besheer. Together, both of them pursued thin leads in international globetrotting investigative expeditions from the Philippines to Pakistan. They were after the shadowy KSM for his connections to a constellation of terrorist plots, including the 1993 bombing attempt against the World Trade Center. But it was a lucky break during an interrogation in Udorn, Thailand, where a captured Al-Qaeda member recognized KSM's face in a photo lineup, that provided the missing piece identifying KSM as the operations officer for the 9/11 terror attack.

The rest of the story is a roller-coaster ride of promising leads and set-backs, the latter often involving foreign and domestic U.S. government restrictions, non-cooperation, or banal bureaucratic inertia. But enough critical mass and momentum builds to keep the investigation rolling forward and enlisting members from a plethora of government agencies. The story does not end after KSM's capture. The narrative follows him through his detention at Bagram Air Base to Guantanamo, describing the difference of opinion between CIA and FBI regarding KSM's ability to withstand "enhanced interrogation techniques." Pellegrino and Besheer's hopes that KSM will be brought to justice in New York are dashed by Congressional action, forbidding the executive branch for expending federal funds to transport enemy combatants from Guantanamo to the United States, even to stand trial. The book ends leaving the reader somewhat in limbo as KSM is confined at Guantanamo, his legal status undetermined and with little indication of what is to be eventually done with him.

Bergen's book is a bit more satisfying in this regard; all the loose ends are tied up by the time the reader is finished with it. However, unlike the in-depth treatment of KSM's personality readers get from McDermott and Meyer, the well-known face of Al Qaeda comes across as a more remote figure in Bergen's narrative. While some personal details are provided, not much understanding of Bin Laden and his motivations are gained, although--as the target--much of the book covers his movements and activities. Bergen knows a great deal of his subject, actually interviewing Bin Laden in 1997 and writing several books about him and Al Qaeda, including *The Osama Bin Laden I Know*. Here the story concentrates almost solely on the process, the organizations, and the people that found and killed him.

Unlike the globetrotting gumshoe trackers Pellegrino and Besheer in *The Hunt for KSM*, Bergen's heroes are Barbara Sude, Jennifer Matthews, Gina Bennett, and "Frederica," all female analysts at or working with CIA's Bin Laden unit. Sude had written the infamous 6 August 2001 Presidential Daily Brief item, "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." As the unit's former leader, Michael Scheuer, explained, female analysts were critical to the search. As he put it: "They seem to have an exceptional knack for detail, for seeing patterns and understanding relationships, and they also, quite frankly, spend a great deal less time telling war stories, chatting, and going outside for cigarettes than the boys." While Scheuer got a lot of grief for his "harem" of analysts, he insists that "If I could have put up a sign saying 'No Boys Need Apply,' I would have done it." Surprisingly, Bergen

maintains in his book that only approximately two dozen people were working the search for Bin Laden full time—that was it. But it was an all-source effort involving many organizations and agencies that led to the working hypothesis that the Al Qaeda leader was at a mysterious compound in Abbottabad.

Despite a great deal of forensic effort, none of Osama's videotapes yielded usable leads, according to Scheuer. There were many false "Elvis" sightings, leading the "Where's Waldo?" searchers down blind alley after blind alley. According to Bergen, by 2005 the CIA finally realized they were not going to get a "golden nugget" of intelligence that would lead them to Bin Laden. It was going to take painstaking all-source analytical work to put this puzzle together. Pursuing three analytical areas—the Bin Laden family, his communications with other Al Qaeda leaders, and his media statements—yielded nothing. But it was the fourth, Bin Laden's courier network, which showed some promise. What proved key to Bin Laden's whereabouts was "The Kuwaiti," a man who turned out to be Bin Laden's principal courier and even lived with him in Abbottabad. KSM and other detainees downplayed this individual when they were interrogated about him, which made "the Kuwaiti" all the more interesting to the analysts.

Jennifer Matthews, as a case officer in Afghanistan, became a fatal casualty when she and her team met with a Jordanian doctor they hoped could infiltrate into Bin Laden's inner circle. To gain his trust, they chose not to search him when he arrived at FOB CHAPMAN in Khost in late December 2009. He turned out to be a suicide bomber, killing Matthews and six others. This intensified the hunt as the war with Al Qaeda became personal for many within the CIA who knew Matthews. By 2010, this effort resulted in a name for "the Kuwaiti" through partner country intelligence. Bergen relates that, by the summer, SIGINT revealed that "the Kuwaiti" might be back with Bin Laden. Analysts were able to geo-locate signals to northwestern Pakistan. CIA local "assets" in Pakistan were able to track "the Kuwaiti" to his transits through Peshawar and obtained a description of his white Suzuki jeep. They then followed him to Abbottabad. The large residential compound where he stopped was immediately interesting as it had no telephone or Internet service. In all other respects the place seemed well-appointed, particularly compared to the surrounding area; analysts were sure whoever lived there had reason to be "off the grid." Overhead imagery captured the physical particulars of the compound, as well as the patterns of life for the inhabitants of the house. But nothing specifically provided a "slam dunk" that Osama Bin Laden lived there.

Bergen's description of the analytical calls and risk assessments made by the analytical experts—to include a Red Team alternative estimate—is one of the strong points of the book. No matter what the reader's particular political persuasion, it is to the credit of the senior officials within the Obama administration that they were as thorough as they were in questioning the intelligence and—despite the fact that the case for Bin Laden's presence was entirely circumstantial—went ahead with the raid. The dramatic description Bergen provides of that operation comes off as almost anti-climactic compared to the slow but inexorable build up of intelligence information and the analytical uncertainties associated with it.

No doubt counter-intelligence professionals will feel scandalized that so much collection and analytical tradecraft is described in these two books. That perhaps is a lesson to be learned in itself; good journalists can and will uncover a great deal. This has been seen and commented on before for other books in other venues. Bergen, McDermott, and Meyer ensure it is going to be an established trend for the foreseeable future.

But for neophytes, both *The Hunt for KSM* and *Manhunt* provide a good glimpse into the complexities and difficulties of tracking down international terrorists. The authors of these two books write in an engaging style that is non-technical and easily understood by the layman. Bergen, McDermott, and Meyer do good service informing as well as entertaining the reader. For the professionals, it is quite fulfilling to see how indefatigable willpower and personal persistence overcame the most daunting of analytical and bureaucratic challenges.



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Help A Marine 0231 Hopeful to Read! Donate Your Old Books!

Marines new to the Navy-Marine Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) at Dam Neck awaiting training in the MAGTF Intelligence Specialist-Entry course need books to help improve their reading skills. Used paperbacks are preferred and don't have to be Marine Corps, warfare, or intelligence-related. Fiction/novels, non-fiction, sports, self-improvement, and other works suitable for casual reading in the barracks off-duty are most welcome.

For those who have donated books in response to the last call in the Winter 2014 *INTSUM* issue, the schoolhouse is extremely thankful for your kind generosity.

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Write for the MCIA, Inc., INTSUM Magazine!

The Marine Corps Intelligence Association, Incorporated, aims to support the Director of Intelligence's vision of professionalizing the intelligence workforce and improving intelligence analysis. We are committed to this goal and intend to service active duty intelligence Marines, Marine reserve intelligence professionals, and the Marine intelligence civilian workforce.

This *INTSUM* you hold in your hands is widely available as a free PDF download from the MCIA, Inc., website at <http://www.mcia-inc.org>. Please send it on and widely disseminate it to your friends and colleagues in the Marine Corps ISR Enterprise. We hope that the *INTSUM* becomes a forum—YOUR forum—for unclassified discussion of intelligence matters written by those who are actively involved in promoting the DIRINT's MCISR-E vision.

That said, we at MCIA, Inc., do not shy away from controversy. We encourage you to submit articles that challenge the conventional wisdom. For those active duty and reserve Marine intelligence professionals, just think about how you'll be able to tell your boss that you've gotten your work published! For the MCISR-E Civilian Marines, use this forum as an opportunity to sound off about those things that few in uniform are exposed to or require greater clarification and discussion. The *INTSUM* editorial staff is particularly interested in the following articles:

- Unclassified pieces on recent experience in doing intelligence in recent wars (Iraq and Afghanistan).
- Unclassified pieces on recent experiences on lesser-known aspects of intelligence supporting a variety of mission sets (cyber warfare, Theater Security Cooperation, Information Operations, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, and so much more!)
- Doctrinal and/or substantive issues of importance to Marine Corps intelligence.
- Controversial issues—and you can publish anonymously or under a pseudonym. Your controversial idea/position is likely shared by others!
- Persuasive papers, particularly those written for MCIS courses/classes as well as PME courses/sessions that are of intelligence interest.
- Marine Corps Intelligence history from earlier wars and contingencies.
- Profiles in Intelligence: those intelligence Marines who you think deserve special recognition for their accomplishments. If you knew an intelligence Marine who died through combat action, stories about them are especially valued for a special "Roll of Honor" profile.
- DIRINT Recommended Reading List Book Discussion Guides
- Intelligence decision-forcing cases for use in case method education (see page 26 for an example)
- Transition tips and tricks, specifically oriented on the needs and qualifications of intelligence Marines.
- Short (1 page) articles recommending books for the DIRINT's Recommended Reading List and Book Reviews for books not intended for the DIRINT's Recommended Reading List.
- Current events articles that would be of interest to Marine intelligence professionals, whether they would be active duty, reserves, or civilians.
- Upcoming reserve augmentation opportunities.
- Letters To the Editor
- And--of course--cartoons and "sea stories!"

AUTHORS PUBLISHING A FULL PAGE OR MORE OF *INTSUM* CONTENT WILL RECEIVE A FREE YEAR OF MCIA, INC., MEMBERSHIP IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE OR A YEAR EXTENSION OF AN EXISTING MEMBERSHIP! START WRITING NOW!

We're also looking for "roving reporters" for MCIA, Inc., who can help us cover retirements, promotions, and other events that would be of interest to the *INTSUM* readership!

Remember, this is YOUR intelligence association—let others know what you are thinking!

Send your ideas in a query letter/manuscript to the *INTSUM* editor at INTSUM@mcia-inc.org.

MCIA, Inc., *INTSUM* Author Submission Guidelines

Specific instructions for submission of articles for publication within the MCIA, Inc., *INTSUM* magazine:

Manuscripts must meet the following guidelines:

- Double-spaced MicroSoft Word (.doc or .docx) or Rich Text Format (.rtf) with one-inch margins on all sides.
- Include a title page with the article title and the author's name, degrees, and affiliations.
- Include a one-paragraph biography of the author or authors at the beginning of the paper.
- Include a list of three to five (3-5) key words that express the precise content of the manuscript (used for indexing purposes), positioned immediately following the abstract.
- Include a photograph of the author or authors (for inclusion in the journal if the article is published).
- Signed statement that manuscripts on contemporary intelligence issues have undergone Security Review.

Illustrations and photos (including drawings, diagrams, and charts) must be numbered in one consecutive series. Prefer these to be in JPEG (.jpg) softcopy format of at least 300 dots per inch (dpi) and attach in the largest view possible. You can send these as separate e-mails if the file sizes are too large for your server to handle. If you are mailing photos or illustrations: type the captions for illustrations on a separate page. Photographs should be large, glossy prints, showing high contrasts. Identify figures on the back with author's name and number of the illustration, if applicable.

Reference endnotes and their text citations should be prepared according to the reference style recommended in current edition of the *Chicago Manual of Style*.

To submit a manuscript for peer review:

- Check the manuscript for content and style (correct spelling, punctuation, and grammar; accuracy and consistency in the citation of figures, tables, and references; stylistic uniformity of entries in the references section; etc.). Manuscripts containing numerous typos or errors will be returned to the author for revision before they are submitted for peer review.
- Ensure that all required sections of the manuscript are completed (abstract, bio, key words, learning Objectives if applicable, multiple-choice questions if applicable, author photos, author resume).

Send the manuscript, in Word format, via email to INTSUM@mcia-inc.org or mail it in Word format on CD or floppy disk (labeled with identifying information) to the MCIA, Inc., address. Accompanying materials such as photos and maps or other graphics may also be mailed.

Once received, a manuscript will be reviewed to ensure it meets the submission guidelines. It will then be sent for peer-review to members of an editorial board. The reviewers may accept the article as-is, require changes before acceptance, or reject the paper. MCIA, Inc. will pass on reviewer comments to the author.

Important Exclusivity Note: By submitting a manuscript to MCIA, Inc., an author certifies that the material has not been and will not be submitted to any other publication prior to its appearance in the *INTSUM Magazine*.

Please Send Us a Photo of Yourself. Please send a photograph of yourself and your coauthors (if applicable) when you submit your article. We will include this photograph with your article if your article is featured in the journal. In order to publish your photograph we need a high quality photograph that meets the specifications listed above. Additionally, quality headshots are preferred, preferably with only you (or you and your co-authors, if applicable), in the shot. Photographs do not have to be taken by a professional photography studio, although such photographs are preferred. We would also love to receive "action" shots in addition to headshots. These might be pictures of you at your desk, at work, on a scene, etc. These photos should show you in professional attire.

Photos That Will NOT Work: The following types of photographs are NOT acceptable for print: Digital images/pictures saved from a website, bitmap digital files (either from a digital camera or from a scanned photograph), printed copies of images/pictures from a website, photos embedded in a Word document (or other word-processing document), passport or driver's license photos.

We're Looking for a Few Good Liaisons!

To support our Association's new strategy and objectives (published in the Winter-Spring 2013 *INTSUM*), MCIA, Inc., is seeking volunteers to serve as liaisons to active duty Marine Intelligence Organizations -- ideal candidates are former/retired Marine intelligence professionals (of any rank or discipline) who live and work in the **geographic areas listed below**. Liaisons would be the local "face" and "voice" of MCIA, Inc., to active duty intelligence Marines, serve as a conduit for information flow between the Association and active duty points of contact, and have the potential to participate in social and command events involving intelligence Marines. The extent of the program on the local level will be up to individual liaisons and their active duty counterparts.

The MCIA, Inc., Liaison plan was briefed to the USMC Director of Intelligence (DIRINT) and other senior active duty intelligence leadership during the Fall HQMC Intelligence Operational Advocacy Group (OAG) in Quantico, September 2013. The response was very positive, and has the DIRINT's support- command G-2s, intelligence unit commanders, and senior intelligence Marines in service/national organizations have been asked to solicit volunteers to serve as active duty points of contact within their organizations. For those of you who have been with the organization for a few years, this is an opportunity for establishing informal communication and partnership between the active duty Marine Intelligence Community and MCIA, Inc., and not resurrecting the chapter system.

If you are interested in this opportunity to interact with and serve active duty intelligence Marines while promoting the benefits and goals of our organization, contact the MCIA, Inc., Membership Committee Chair soonest- John Walls (john.walls@mcia-inc.org; phone (919) 346-1394).

- I. National Capital Area/Quantico -- Need Volunteer
- II. Tidewater (Norfolk) Area -- Need volunteer
- III. Lejeune Area -- Need volunteer
- IV. Cherry Point/MCAS Beaufort Area -- Need volunteer
- V. Florida Area -- Need volunteer
- VI. Marine Forces Reserve (New Orleans centered) -- Need volunteer
- VII. Midwest/Rockies Area -- Need volunteer
- VIII. Pendleton Area -- CWO5 Joe Moran, USMCR (Ret.) (949) 248-6606
jonathan.g.moran@gmail.com
- IX. Miramar/San Diego Area -- Need volunteer
- X. Hawaii Area -- Col Jim Werth, USMC (Ret.) (808) 342-2060 jwerth007@yahoo.com
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MCIA, Inc., needs Association Officers and billet holders for the following-- submit your nominations!

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Navy Expeditionary Medal	Awarded: / /
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Kosovo	Awarded: / /
Iraq	Awarded: / /
Afghanistan	Awarded: / /

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I certify the information provided heron is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. In support thereof, I have attached a copy of my DD 214 ☐ Intelligence School Graduation Certificate ☐ or other official documents ☐ . Accordingly, I request that I be accepted as a Regular Member ☐ / Associate Member ☐ / Auxiliary Member ☐ of the Marine Corps Intelligence Association, Incorporated.	
I do ☐ do not ☐ authorize my name and address/contact information to be published in MCIA, Inc., official publications	
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